Buchrezension zu: Dudekováet, Gabriela u. a.: Toward the modern woman. Bratislava: Veda, 2011 by Baer, Josette
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2012
Buchrezension zu: Dudekováet, Gabriela u. a.: Toward the modern woman.
Bratislava: Veda, 2011
Baer, Josette
Abstract: Na ceste k modernej žene: Kapitoly z dejín rodových vzt’ahov na Slovensku (Toward the Mod-
ern Woman: Chapters from the History of Family Relations in Slovakia). Edited by Gabriela Dudeková
et al. (Bratislava, Veda, 2011)
DOI: 10.1162/JINH_r_00401
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-66976
Originally published at:
Baer, Josette (2012). Buchrezension zu: Dudekováet, Gabriela u. a.: Toward the modern woman.
Bratislava: Veda, 2011. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 43(2):322-325. DOI: 10.1162/JINH_r_00401
Deep History: The Architecture of Past and Present. By Andrew Shryock,
Daniel Lord Smail, et al. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2011)
342 pp. $29.95
Deep History brings together anthropologists, archaeologists, and histori-
ans to ponder the challenges of studying the remote past that extends
back long before writing. A series of co-authored essays attempt to re-
move the barriers that separate what the editors call deep and shallow
history, studied by seemingly different and distinct methodologies.
The chapters form “a master narrative” in four parts. Part I, “Prob-
lems and Orientation,” comprises two chapters. An introduction stresses
the importance of deep history, arguing that historians have not yet ad-
justed to the reality of such a past. Chapter 2, “Imagining the Human in
Deep Time,” develops four fundamental metaphors and orientations
that can be used as links to the remoter past—kinshipping, exchange,
extensions, hospitality, and genealogy. This thought-provoking chapter
sets the stage for the three parts that follow.
Part II examines three topics. Chapter 3, “The Body,” connects us
to the past through the human form, shaped for most of our existence by
culture, more recently by the epigenetic forces of the modern world.
Chapter 4, “Energy and Ecosystems,” argues that feedback loops and
conjoined patterns of cause and effect, which can be traced far back into
the past, are effective devices for deep history. Language receives em-
phasis, because of both the genealogical relationships between languages
and the notion of a web or net; exchanges between languages were cru-
cial to the development of human speech. Four chapters explore
“Shared Substance,” among them food and deep kinship, on the argu-
ment that sharing is a highly adaptable process that can reveal striking
transformations in human behavior. Unlike our primate cousins, we
have used food and kinship to create worlds that are highly aware of past
and present. Networks of relationship and exchange are also shared sub-
stances that represent kinshipping, which allows us to communicate
over distance and also to reconnect, a basic tool for creating history.
The ªnal set of essays, “Human Expansion,” takes a broad perspec-
tive. Migration discusses the movements of humans around the world,
which is made possible by cultural toolkits and mobility. Changes in so-
cial networks, different food ways, and adaptations resulted from the set-
tlement of different continents. “Goods” refers to material objects that
connected distant populations and built complex exchange networks,
the effects of which changed deep history. “Scale” ably dissects the as-
sumption that human development is progressive, cumulative, and di-
rectional. Herein lies the central argument of this book: Deep time is
visible in the structure of our minds and bodies and in our created mate-
rial and social world—“the storehouse of the human experience” (272).
Deep History attempts to decipher the challenges of melding the re-
mote and more recent past into a uniªed history of humankind. The
chapters are perceptive, if at times esoteric in their arguments. They are
Reviews
more of a challenge for historians than for archaeologists, who will be fa-
miliar with many arguments in these pages. But they make a compelling
case for a scholarly communication and an interdisciplinary history that
focus on understanding humanity—something that is long overdue.
Brian Fagan
University of California, Santa Barbara
Tributary Empires in Global History. Edited by Peter Fibiger Bang and
Christopher A. Bayly (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 294 pp.
$85.00 cloth $29.95 paper
The varied travails of the United States have placed empire on the public
and intellectual agenda. Regrettably, the cognitive level of the resulting
discussion has been low. Far too many commentators have assumed
equivalence between Washington and Rome, exemplifying the habit of
treating empire as a monolithic category. This superb collection is to be
warmly welcomed for taking a different approach. Most obviously, it
provides a clear sense of the basic character of pre-industrial empires. Al-
though these polities lacked the advanced means of communication and
transport that distinguished modern commercial empires, they were able
nonetheless to maintain large expanses of territory by extracting tribute
in various forms. The introduction and the chapter by Bang are espe-
cially useful in this regard, describing the pretensions widely shared by
many such empires, while recognizing their fundamental logistical
weaknesses. The dilemma of empire was nicely captured by the Roman
poet Vergil in the Aeneid c. 19 b.c.: Should the state “spare the humble”
or “destroy the proud”? Most empires tried the ªrst strategy but acted
savagely on occasion to remove any notions of genuine autonomy from
the people that they had subjugated.
The ªrst part of the book deals with historiography. Bayly show
how discourses have been, and continue to be, shaped by telescopic
views of development and by prejudicial views of Islam. Fabrizio De
Donno complements this observation by revealing the extraordinary
inºuence of James Bryce’s Holy Roman Empire (London, 1864) on Italian
historians. Baki Tezcan’s chapter amusingly describes the “standard”
view of late Ottoman degeneracy as a construct of those wishing to re-
form the Empire at the end of the nineteenth century.
The second part of the book ranges widely. Applying a Darwinian
theory of social evolution, Garry Runciman makes intriguing comments
about the differential longevity of empires. Michal Tymowski suggests
that African empires were made especially weak by the absence of settled
agricultural cores. Andre Wink details the ways in which settlement in
north India changed Mongol behavior. David Ludden deals with dis-
putes about the control of borderlands and frontiers. Finally, Giovanni
Salmeri offers an account of Sicilian history from the Roman Empire to
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the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, revealing how the inhabitants cannily
developed strategies and discourses to defend their liberties.
The third part of the book turns to comparison. After Bang’s chap-
ter, a pair of chapters—one by Walter Scheidel about East and West
Eurasia and the other by Chris Wickham about late Rome and the Arab
Caliphate—study ªscal sociology. Stephen Blake’s account of the inner
politics of the Mughal, Safavid, and Ottoman Empires is a tour de force.
The volume concludes with a chapter by Karen Barkey and Rudi
Batzell explaining the different responses of the Ottomans, Romanovs,
and Hapsburgs to the general crisis of the seventeenth century.1
The contributors, justly celebrated as experts in their respective
ªelds, write at the top of their form. Anyone wanting to understand the
mechanisms of rule in premodern empires, and much more, would do
well to start with this volume.
John A. Hall
McGill University
Dove va la storia economica? Metodi e prospettive, secc. XIII–XVIII (Where is
Economic History Going? Methods and Prospects from the 13th to the 18th Cen-
turies). Edited by Francesco Ammannati (Florence, Firenze University
Press, 2011) 566 pp. N.P.
In 1410, Francesco Datini, the son of Marco, better known to economic
historians as the merchant of Prato, died, leaving behind the largest busi-
ness archives of late medieval Europe, including over 120,000 letters re-
ceived from partners and agents from across Europe and the Mediterra-
nean. On the 500th anniversary of his death, the International Institute
named after Datini devoted its annual conference to a broad-ranging as-
sessment of the methods and perspectives adopted by economic histori-
ans of pre-industrial Europe (with marginal interest in the Ottoman Em-
pire).
The volume is divided into four sections. The ªrst, entitled “Old
and New Insights in the Different Linguistic Regions: The Topics,”
contains eight chapters, each one concerning the varying fortunes and
changing topical interests in the ªeld, as seen from the academic scholar-
ship in each of the main European languages and in Turkish. With a few
exceptions (namely, Jan de Vries’ conªdence in the healthy condition of
Dutch economic history), most of the authors lament a decline in inter-
est in economic history among academic historians. They are often able
to document this decline with quantitative surveys of peer-review jour-
nals’ output and the relative representation of economic historians
among university faculty. This section is the only one followed by a dis-
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1 See also the special issue, “The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Interdisciplinary Per-
spectives,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XL (2009), 145–303.
cussant’s rejoinder—a useful tool that helps readers to reºect critically on
several, disjointed contributions.
In his remarks, Marco Belfanti counterbalances the general pessi-
mism by stressing the success of business history and the scholarship on
recent economic phenomena and crises. He also maintains that “the
golden age” of the economic history of pre-industrial Europe (which he
dates to the decades between 1960 and 1990) coincided with a time
when economic history provoked debates among a wider audience be-
cause of its methodological innovations. But Belfanti mainly hints at the
question of how we might make that moment come alive again (with
reference to the need for more collaboration among national historio-
graphies and continued archival research). This theme looms large over
the volume as a whole but is never addressed in a sustained fashion.
The second section (“Old and New Insights: Tools”) collects ten chap-
ters, each devoted to one type of primary source used by economic
historians—government records, notarial deeds, literary texts, maps, the
visual arts, archeological digs, and the private collections of noble fami-
lies and merchants.
The third section (“Old and New Insights: Relationships with
Other Subjects”) seeks to address the controversy surrounding the use of
economic theory and quantitative methods (which emerges elsewhere as
well). Paolo Malanima emphasizes the importance of both approaches
and thus implicitly responds to Alberto Grohmann, whose earlier chap-
ter bemoans the growing recourse to “economic and mathematical
models” and “large data bases” at the expense of the use of “archival
documents” (34–35). Mark Thomas states that “the economic history
literature of early modern Europe was richly quantitative long before
formal statistical methods became de rigeur” (430). He then examines the
speciªc statistical methods that have had the greatest impact in the
ªeld—regression analysis of cross-section data and time series—but he
also discusses nonparametric and spatial analysis, including Geographical
Information Systems (gis). Guillaume Daudin continues this assessment
by charting the use of different quantitative methods in journals accessi-
ble via jstor and by summarizing important insights gained through
econometrics about speciªc topics. Supposing that “we all aspire at be-
ing foxes rather than hedgehogs” (458), Daudin offers a balanced ac-
count of the strengths and weaknesses of quantitative methods, which he
examines in their broad variety, to include the “analytical narratives” ad-
vocated by new institutional economic historians whose ambition is “to
extract generalizations from case studies” (471).
The volume ends with an eclectic “Concluding Round Table.” Its
ªrst three chapters trace the representation of scholarship on the pre-
industrial period in three academic journals: Investigaciones de Historia
Económica, Scandinavian Economic History Review, and Vierteljahrschrift für
Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Four brief pieces end the collection with
reºections on the future of economic history in Germany (where the
prevalence of practitioners who use econometrics is disputed), Italy
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(where the discipline is described as conditioned by different institu-
tional constraints in economics and humanistic departments), France
(where the inºuence of Michel Foucault, gender history, and literary
criticism is shown to have had a crucial impact on expanding the themes
and methodologies used by economic and social historians), Russia
(where information technology [it] and statistics are said to be rejuve-
nating the ªeld and attracting students), and Poland (where after the fall
of the Berlin Wall, university curricula have excluded the economic
analysis of past societies to concentrate on the recent emergence of the
market economy).
As is customary, the proceedings of the annual Datini conferences
include texts in multiple languages (this time Italian, French, English,
and Spanish) that are not always written by native speakers and that are
not revised or copyedited before going to print. The result is, once
again, a volume that lacks neither useful information nor insights but
stands in desperate need of structure, connecting threads, and basic edit-
ing.
Francesca Trivellato
Yale University
Beyond Our Means: Why America Spends While the World Saves. By Shel-
don Garon (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2012) 475 pp. $29.95
Why are some people like Aesop’s grasshopper while others are like
ants? Why, indeed, are whole countries inclined to grasshopper-like im-
providence while others are ant-like in their dedication to thrift? These
are the questions that Garon tackles via a transnational and historical
study of what we might call “small-savings culture.”
The core of the book, ªve of its twelve chapters, is devoted to the
origins, institutionalization, and fate of thrift practices and bank savings
in Japan. Garon, as a specialist in Japanese history, might well be ex-
pected to write about the Japanese, and, more generally, the East Asian
propensity toward industriousness and thriftiness. Indeed, he supplies a
fascinating account of Tokugawa-era exemplars of self-denial and sav-
ings. But to him, culture “is formed and re-formed by ideas and institu-
tions” and especially by state policy. Consequently, he ªnds that the
famed Japanese inclination to save, far from being eternal, took shape as
the Meiji government introduced the savings institutions and propa-
ganda agencies that had been developed earlier in Europe. He therefore
embeds this story into the history of a larger, transnational movement to
encourage thrift among the popular classes.
His account of Japanese thrift is interlarded with chapters about the
emergence of a cult of thrift in Europe and America (redolent of Ben-
jamin Franklin and Samuel Smiles); the creation of accessible ªnancial
institutions (savings banks, mutual banks, and building societies); and the
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development of public policy to encourage popular savings, both for
purposes of social uplift (civilizing the working classes) and state devel-
opment (ªnancing war and infrastructure). This international movement
varied in its national details, but in most countries, it came to focus on
the construction of national postal savings systems that harnessed com-
prehensive networks of ofªces to the task of gathering the modest sav-
ings of the masses. Nowhere did the postal savings movement succeed in
building a ªnancial juggernaut equal to that of Japan, which helped to
ªnance Japan’s empire, its wars, its postwar industrialization, and its cur-
rent colossal public debt.
Garon ardently supports thrift as a national project; it shapes charac-
ter, fosters democratic inclusiveness, and stands as a bulwark against base
consumerism. He is less concerned with the more instrumental purposes
of saving, eschewing altogether the macroeconomic functions of savings
in a national economy. Consequently, he has little to say about the rea-
sonableness of state-supported pro-savings campaigns. He agrees with all
of them, whether the purpose is the suppression of vicious habits (save
rather than drink) or the fueling of imperial ambition. He claims that Ja-
pan’s wartime savings campaign was so successful that it prolonged
World War II, although he notes that these savings were eviscerated by
inºation, gaining the savers nothing. The West offered similar, if less
stark, stories of savings expropriated by state policy, but Garon reserves
his arch expressions of disapproval for the advocates of consumer credit.
Consumer credit is, in some respects, the alternative to small sav-
ings: One can acquire durable goods by saving for them or by borrowing
and “saving” to pay off the loan. The difference may well be no more
than a matter of timing. But to Garon—and he is certainly not alone in
this respect—the difference is enormous, tantamount to the difference
between prudence and proºigacy, between independence and servility,
and between uplift and debasement. Garon insists that policy rather than
culture stands behind savings behavior, but the United States stands as an
exception to nearly every country in his story. Its anti-saving policies
(except between World War I and World War II) seem to have created a
durable consumerist culture that has no place for the encouragement of
popular thrift. From the toothless form of America’s postal savings sys-
tem to its pioneering innovations in consumer credit (installment buy-
ing, credit cards, home equity loans, et al.), Americans have long been
encouraged to under-save and over-consume.
Such, at any rate, is Garon’s opinion. The few comprehensive data
sets that he employs do not always support his argument, and he dis-
misses without much discussion economists’ analyses of savings behav-
ior. There is considerable slippage in his text between the motives for
savings among the popular classes and the macroeconomic determinants
of the savings rate. Readers will not ªnd a systematic study of the evolv-
ing role of savings for household economies, but they will ªnd a lively
account, spiced with strong opinions, of the historical policies that have
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shaped what we now often regard as national cultures of thrift. On that
score, the book is well worth reading.
Jan de Vries
University of California, Berkeley
In Defence of Learning: The Plight, Persecution, and Placement of Academic
Refugees, 1933–1980s. Edited by Shula Marks, Paul Weindling, and Laura
Wintour (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011) 320 pp. $110.00
It was clear at the end of World War II that one of the enduring and
consequential results of the fascist regimes, and especially the Nazi dicta-
torship, was the persecution and dispersal in exile of much of the top tier
of Europe’s scholars and scientists and the resettlement abroad of those
who survived. The number of refugee scholars was not great, but their
importance in the cultural life of the time was enormous. It was obvious
that some account of the consequences of this intellectual migration
would have to be given. The ºow of publications—of memoirs, indi-
vidual and group biographies, indexes of refugees by country and profes-
sion, statistical analyses, and interpretations of the importance of this
phenomenon—began in the 1960s and continues to this day, the latest
contribution being this volume. Largely memoiristic, the book is unique
in the breadth of its coverage; although the essays concentrate on the ef-
fort to rescue the scholars persecuted by the Nazis in Germany and the
former Austro-Hungarian Empire, they extend beyond World War II
and Central Europe to include efforts to help scholars and scientists seek-
ing aid in the Soviet Union, in apartheid South Africa, and in post-
Allende Chile.
The core of the book is the evolving history of the Council for As-
sisting Refugee Academics (cara) founded by William Beveridge in
1933 at the urging of Leo Szilard, a peripatetic physicist, to rescue the
academic victims of Nazism in Germany. The efforts of the committee,
managed for forty years by Esther Simpson, herself an early refugee,
were formidable—far beyond anything undertaken in the United States.
Well-organized, the committee scoured the foundations and scholarly
organizations for funds and for the identiªcation of endangered scholars,
set up a procedure to receive applications for aid, and through interme-
diaries reached out to the less notable scholars struggling to survive. The
seventeen chapters include individual biographical studies of Szilard,
Archibald V. Hill, Max Perutz, Karl Mannheim and Viola Klein, and
group biographies of women refugees, Austrian social scientists, Central
European historians, and refugee academics from the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, South Africa, and Chile.
In the introduction, Marks presents a narrative of the evolution of
cara, assessings its accomplishments, often in comparison with institu-
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tions in the United States and elsewhere that were also involved in help-
ing the refugees. In addition, she provides an overview of the chapters,
noting that they “can only go some way to capturing the often tragic but
also not infrequently triumphant history of academic refugees in the
twentieth century” (25).
As in any collection, the chapters vary in character, breadth, and
penetration. Three of the collective studies are especially notable. Tibor
Frank, an authority on Austro-Hungarian migrations and an Americanist
with much experience in the United States, compares the organized res-
cue efforts in Europe and the United States, to the detriment of the
Americans. Tracing the work of the Rockefeller Foundation, the New
School for Social Research, and the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, he notes in every case the “self-interested beneªcence” of
these organizations (159). The American foundations, endowments, and
research institutions were always looking inward; they “primarily sup-
ported those who were viewed as having the greatest potential useful-
ness for the USA” (143). Indeed, “contemporary critics of the Rockefel-
ler Foundation go as far as to suggest that it occasionally helped Nazi
Germany more than it did its victims.” In the end, however, Franks
deems “the naked representation of American interests” in these rescue
efforts as “unfair” in view of the context: the Depression, the realities of
American academic life, American “hostility to foreigners and Jews,”
and the quota laws. “Whatever might be said,” he concludes, the U.S.
government and the large foundations “did save a great many lives”
(159–160).
The chapter by Antoon De Baets, an authority on the censorship of
history, attempts to test “Plutarch’s thesis” that exile can be a blessing in
disguise. According to Leszek Kolakowski, “the position of outsider,
with its uncertain status and identity, confers a cognitive privilege: cre-
ativity arises from insecurity” (211). But did it? De Baets concludes that
on balance, although forced departure was a tragedy at the micro-, indi-
vidual level, “at the macro level of historical writing . . . loss for the
country of origin was not generally equaled by gain for the country of
destination. The international cross-fertilization embodied in, or ema-
nating from, refugee historians would probably have happened anyway,
if perhaps more slowly.” The real blessing that the émigré historians
conferred was their courage in keeping alive, in difªcult circumstances,
the version of the history of their countries that conformed to “the criti-
cal principles of logic and evidence,” while at home the story had “suc-
cumbed to tyranny, falsiªcation, and lies” (223).
Finally, Christian Fleck, a devoted analyst of the émigré scholars,
offers an account of the Austrian refugee social scientists that goes be-
yond the well-known luminaries to portray statistically the fate of an en-
tire cohort of émigrés—mainly Viennese and Jewish—who became so-
cial scientists in their destination countries. By careful analysis, Fleck
shows that, in general, there was a considerably greater mass of victims
in Austria than in Germany; a larger proportion of Austrian than Ger-
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man professors were dismissed from the universities; and a preponder-
ance of Austrians among the émigrés who became social scientists.
Finally, in contrast to history, the beneªt in the social sciences accrued
entirely to the host country with little loss to the country of origin, since
before their emigration, “most of those who became social scientists
after their escape were earning their living by working in different oc-
cupations, sometimes obscure ones” (200). The social scientists were a
young, cosmopolitan group who assimilated well, particularly in the
United States. They, too, were helped by the refugee organizations, but
mostly by the Americans, who were more open to social science than
the British were. Fleck concludes that whether because of age and out-
look, or political and religious identiªcation, many of the Austrian
émigrés had the individual and cultural characteristics that led more eas-
ily to upward mobility in the host country and to successful careers in
academia.
This fascinating book explores through biographical studies and
group analyses the farthest reaches of the effort, centered in Britain, to
rescue the persecuted scholars who became refugees between 1933 and
the 1980s.
Lotte Bailyn
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Bernard Bailyn
Harvard University
Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. By Michael Barnett
(Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2011) 312 pp. $29.95
At a recent meeting to reªne public-health guidance in humanitarian
emergencies, an expert in disaster relief leaned toward me and whispered
that although he worked for humanitarian organizations, he did not re-
ally know how to deªne humanitarianism. He might do well to read
Barnett’s Empire of Humanity, at least to ªnd some justiªcation for his
uncertainty. The closest that Barnett comes to deªning his subject is his
notion that “different traditions of humanitarianism, and different kinds
of humanitarian organizations with different missions make different de-
cisions . . . and project different kinds of moral imaginations that chal-
lenge themselves and the world in different ways” (33). Although this
deªnition is maximally ambiguous, it is, nevertheless, accurate. Barnett
tries to sort through these differences, catalog them, classify them, and
analyze them. He does so with varying degrees of originality, and at dif-
ferent levels of depth, but overall his book is a convincing and, most of
the time, entertaining history of a signiªcant (although not as signiªcant
as Barnett claims it to be) area of global activity that has been grossly
underrepresented in the academic literature.
There are, indeed, many different perspectives on how to try to
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provide assistance to the unfortunate millions around the world who are
caught up in circumstances that leave them in the most vulnerable state
imaginable. From a historical standpoint, Barnett presents three: imperial
humanitarianism, practiced from the early nineteenth century (encom-
passing the age of slavery and abolition, and the savagery of the colonial
era) through the end of World War II; neo-humanitarianism, the guid-
ing principle of the Cold War period, which included the rise to inde-
pendence of most of today’s developing countries; and liberal humani-
tarianism, practiced in an age relatively free of interstate conºict but
increasingly characterized by ethnic strife, terrorism, and the failure of
established states.
Insofar as the philosophical and political trends that have helped to
shape humanitarianism are concerned, this historical breakdown makes
sense, though many nuances within the ªeld could be taken into ac-
count. The ªeld of public health in humanitarian crises began to develop
at the time of the Cambodian genocide of the late 1970s; it continued to
take shape during the refugee crisis in Somalia, which extended from
that time (after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and the estab-
lishment of the communist Dergue regime in neighboring Ethiopia) un-
til the mid-1980s.
Serious attempts to grapple with “failed states” and to provide even
minimal levels of assistance to those affected by the collapse of their po-
litical system (as ineffectual or inequitable as it might have been) became
the focus of humanitarianism after the debacle of foreign intervention in
Somalia in 1991. A move to “professionalize” humanitarian workers—
to ensure minimal levels of competence for international aid workers, as
opposed to relying mostly on good will and generous spirits—began af-
ter the colossal failure of the “humanitarian community” to provide ef-
fective relief to Hutu refugees ºeeing Rwanda to Goma, in then Zaire,
after the overthrow of the genocidal regime in Kigali in July 2004.
Barnett presents his history of humanitarianism in broad strokes,
largely for the beneªt of those unfamiliar with the sometime strange land
of humanitarianism rather than for the handful of knowledgeable, but
often heavily opinionated, observers and commentators who more per-
manently inhabit the humanitarian world. For this general audience,
Empire of Humanity is an excellent and thought-provoking introduction.
In his attempt to deconstruct the larger picture into its smaller pix-
els, Barnett’s other principal distinction is between those organizations
and individuals who practice “emergency relief” and those who use “al-
chemical” processes to address the root causes of humanitarian crises and
transform stagnant and struggling societies into budding, even thriving,
success stories. The emergency groups, typiªed by the International
Committee of the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres, purportedly
supply immediate relief in a politically independent manner to those af-
fected by catastrophe; they bandage the wounded, care for the sick, and
so forth. However, they do not seek to alter the underlying circum-
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stances that are more distally related to a crisis. Barnett points out, cor-
rectly, that this “apolitical” posturing is a political stance in and of itself.
Barnett reserves the designation of alchemists for those organiza-
tions that provide not only relief in the short term but also play an active
role in trying to extirpate the underlying factors of humanitarian trage-
dies. These organizations are heavily inºuenced by their donors (fre-
quently the governments of rich countries) and by their interpretation of
what is morally, ethically, and socially desirable. Many of them are also
faith-based and grounded in at least the principles, if not the practices, of
organized, invariably Western, religions.
Although this difference in orientation will be obvious to many
readers, and although the transition from short-term relief to longer-
term development in the wake of natural or man-made disasters is
widely known to be problematical, Barnett’s compelling presentation of
the two sides is a worthwhile contribution to the literature. Nonetheless,
the book has three ºaws—two of omission and one of commission.
First, given Barnett’s clear presentation of the three historical trends of
humanitarianism (imperial, neo-, and liberal, he might well have ex-
plored how a single humanitarian intervention would have worked in
each of the three eras. A simulation of this kind could have driven home,
neatly and conclusively, the points that the author tries to make
throughout the book.
Second, the growing trend toward the involvement of military
forces in humanitarian interventions, though mentioned, is not given
nearly as much attention as it deserves. An incisive discussion of the in-
creasingly frequent and highly controversial incursion of the foreign pol-
icies of donor nations into the humanitarian discourse would have been
welcome.
Finally, Barnett’s tendency to use the ªrst-person singular often
blurs the line between intellectual analysis and personal opinion. His
mini-lectures can distract from the ºow of the narrative and inject ex-
cessive emotion into what purports to be an objective and scholarly
treatment. Yet, Barnett’s obvious passion for his subject is not necessarily
a detriment; insofar as the book both educates and entertains, it can cer-
tainly be excused.
Ronald J. Waldman
Columbia University
Byzantium in the Iconoclast Era c. 680–850: A History. By Leslie Brubaker
and John Haldon (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011) 918
pp. $165.00
This is the most important book on Byzantium to appear in my lifetime.
The authors admirably fulªll their stated intention to discuss political re-
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covery and institutional reshaping, the ªnal stages in the evolution of
eastern Orthodox dogma, the emergence of a new political and social
elite, the transformation of urban life as well as urban-rural relations, and
the generation of a new “medieval” perspective on the past. The crucial
signiªcance of the iconoclast era, which nestles within, but is not fully
contiguous with, what historians usually call the “Mid-Byzantine Pe-
riod,” has always been recognized. But with the appearance of this
book, its history will never be the same. The book contains an astonish-
ingly thorough synthesis of the scholarship, a scrupulously fair presenta-
tion of historiographical contention, and a number of original argu-
ments.
The book’s ªrst ªve chapters present a historical survey of the pe-
riod, with questions of iconoclasm, image breaking, at the heart of the
discussion. In the traditional telling, iconoclasm was introduced by Em-
peror Leo III in 726 and dominated Byzantine history until the middle
of the ninth century. The next six chapters are thematic, treating social,
economic, political, and institutional history, sparing no critical topic.
The ªnal chapter asks what iconoclasm was actually all about. The book
is dense and detailed, although nicely written. It is likely to be consulted
more often than read cover to cover.
The product of a felicitous collaboration between an art historian
and a historian of society and institutions, this volume is truly interdisci-
plinary. The authors read and interpret the written sources fully and
carefully, according special attention to matters of genre and audience.
But they also use visual and material evidence—mosaics, frescoes, and
images on coins; architecture; cloth and metal work. In key sections of
Chapters 6 to 11, the authors deploy numismatic evidence and argu-
ments. Sigillography plays an important role in several chapters. The
Byzantines have left behind thousands of lead seals that bear names,
dates, and titles. Everywhere they use archaeology, drawing always on
the latest research.
Among the book’s larger arguments is, ªrst, that iconoclasm itself
was never a mass movement. It was a tool of imperial politics, as was the
triumph of the iconophiles. Second, the normative iconophile interpre-
tation of iconoclasm that emerged in the ninth century can no longer
stand. Its central arguments were tendentious, to be sure, but also au-
thentic ways of telling the story the way in which they believed it had to
be told. The authors are less “iconoclastic” about the sources than Speck
was—and not all readers will accept all their criticisms—but they destroy
the iconophile narrative once and for all.1 Third, seventh-century By-
zantium practiced “crisis management,” whereas eighth- and ninth-
century Byzantium engaged in substantive and successful reform.
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Fourth, the authors drive the last nail into the cofªn of Ostrogorski’s ar-
gument that the “theme system”—Byzantium’s fundamental institu-
tional structure—emerged with Herakleios (610–640) and took shape by
the middle of the eighth century.2 In fact, it was introduced by Nike-
phoros I (802–811) and assumed ªnal form during the 830s.
In the end, iconoclasm was about representation and about Byzan-
tine responses to Islam. The shift in the way that sacred images were ei-
ther embraced or rejected came at the turn of the eighth century as By-
zantium faced the massive crisis caused by the Arabs and Islam. It was the
total situation, and not aniconic Islam—a crucial point—that spawned
the controversy. Why was God punishing his people? Living holy men
and relics provided access to the divine but they were not inªnitely re-
producible. Images painted by humans were, but they raised questions
about the relationship between the image and the person represented.
The critical issue was a shift from physical presence to representation.
Contention about visual representation soon turned into a battle about
the representation of history, religion, and culture.
Thomas F. X. Noble
University of Notre Dame
Group Identity in the Renaissance World. By Hannah Chapelle Wojcie-
howski (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011) 360 pp. $90.00
Six vignettes, meaningfully ordered as one would expect of any carefully
constructed theatrical masterpiece, constitute the core of this study:
(1) In 1506, Pope Julius II took hold of the recently excavated ancient
marble masterpiece wherein the Ancient Greek god Laocoön vainly at-
tempts to protect his two sons from a lethal tangle of snakes, a grouping
that seduces the viewer with its portrayal of excruciating, sexually
charged pain. (2) Reports from the New World about cannibalism, a
linguistic corruption of the term Caraíba (Caribbean), evoke sublimi-
nal anxieties about the symbolic eating of Christ’s body and blood.
(3) Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) incongruously allows for slavery. (4) In
1561 at Goa, Portuguese inquisitors ªghting the devil’s dentist defeat
mercantile proªteers to capture and execute by ªre the dalada, Buddha’s
left canine tooth, a relic as powerful as any in the Christian panoply.
(5) In his love letter to Ophelia, Hamlet’s reference to his body as a ma-
chine, or perhaps he refers to his penis, suggests an image ªrst seen in
Leonardo da Vinci’s drawings nearly a century earlier. (6) Italian wan-
dering humanist Pietro della Valle encounters a hospital in Gujarat, In-
dia, where loving care is provided for birds that have lost their mates,
evoking memories of how death has taken his beloved wife Sitti Maani
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Gioerida, a Christian warrior whom he describes as being armed in “the
manner of an Amazon” (274).
Wojciehowski weaves this erudite, exotic array of six historical mo-
ments to challenge in a fundamental way our understanding of the Re-
naissance. Her approach is ªercely psychoanalytical. Readers of lesser
tolerance for this discipline’s iconic formulations may prefer Stephen
Greenblatt’s prize-winning but heavily diluted version of post-Freudian
analysis, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York, 2011).
The present book is for those who prefer their Freud straight up, at most
splashed with a twist of wry humor and spiked further with theoretical
formulations from Didier Anzieu.
Space precludes treatment of the wonderful nuances and suggestive
possibilities found on virtually every page of this labor of love, almost
Dantean in its careful, chiseled expression and richly illustrated with
eight color plates and thirty-two additional illustrations. Instead, a raw
condensation must sufªce. Wojciehowski asserts that the key to Renais-
sance dynamics is group identity, ªrst in the emergence of the sig-
niªcance of group (Italian gruppo) as an organizing principle and second in
the rapidly shifting challenges to group identity that ºowed from the
contact of the European-Christian group with grouped “others” during
the long sixteenth-century age of discovery and expansion. In her ac-
count, Burckhardt’s emphasis on individualism, humanism, and Greco-
Roman culture are turned inside out, starting with a re-dating of the in-
ception of the Renaissance by two centuries.1 Thus does she set aside the
classical revival initiated by such Florentine artists as Cimabue and
Giotto in favor of the travel journals of amazed European explorers sud-
denly stripped of their recently formed group identity.
The group is a body, as in the “body politic,” and the Renaissance
Euro-Christian body behaved as any (Freudian) body would—incorpo-
rating, biting, expelling, penetrating, reproducing, and maiming. Look
at any sixteenth-century map of the New World and see the image of a
female monster, with a giant breast and an enticing belly. The very term
“America” was an instant success because of its maternal phonemic
forms. But watch out for the cannibals guarding access to her womb,
wherein lay the hidden treasures of golden civilizations in contact with
the waters that also washed upon fabled China. The future of Renais-
sance studies, Wojciehowski concludes, is in the application of emerging
theories of embodied cognition to the analysis of historical group subjec-
tivity.
Rudolph M. Bell
Rutgers University, New Brunswick
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Barbarians & Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500–1865. By Wayne E.
Lee (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011) 340 pp. $34.95
Barbarians and Brothers is a beautifully written work “about restraint and
atrocity, about the many ways societies seek to limit war’s destructive
power, and about the choices and systems that unleash it” (2). In it, Lee
argues that the balance between restraint and “frightfulness” in any par-
ticular conºict can best be understood in terms of four variables—capac-
ity, control, calculation, and culture. War’s devastation can be checked
by the limited destructive capacity of the belligerents. Cultural values or
calculations of utility can also lead communities to attempt to moderate
the violence employed by their warriors, or conversely may encourage
states to push their soldiers to the extremes of brutality. Either way, the
question of control then comes into play—most typically when govern-
ments ªnd it difªcult to limit war’s effects on enemy civilians after pro-
longed conºict has bred inter-society hatred or when logistical failures
force troops to fend for themselves by taking food from civilians.
Barbarians in this context means enemies with a different cultural
background who do not share the same “language and logic of war”;
brothers means compatriots, people who might be members of the same
polity after a war. In brothers’ wars, the tendency was to keep violence
limited: Empathy was stronger; an enemy could be expected to recog-
nize and reciprocate restraint; and excess harm to the opponent was un-
derstood to threaten the desired post-conºict community (which would
include the chastened “brothers.”) In order to explore these concepts,
Lee examines case studies drawn from the Anglo-Irish warfare of the six-
teenth century; the English Civil War; colonial American warfare in
1586 and 1725; the American Revolution (including the 1779 campaign
against the Iroquois); and more brieºy, the American Civil War. His
guiding idea is that “the events of one campaign, and the choices of one
leader and his soldiers . . . reveals more about the nature and experience
of the war, and the restraints on violence within it, than a ºy-over view
of the entire war” (73). This approach is fully justiªed by its execution.
Lee chose his chapter topics well and researched them thoroughly,
eliciting fresh information and insight. Moreover, the chapters collec-
tively enrich our understanding of how sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century wars in the British Isles, along with local conditions, affected the
military ideas and expectations of Britain’s colonists in the New World
at a time when the foundations of a distinctive American approach to
war and military organization were being laid. Lee’s most striking and
important point comes in his conclusion: An exceptionally large propor-
tion of the conºicts that shaped Anglo-American views of warfare were
waged against either “barbarians” or “brothers,” rather than (as was
more common in Europe) against antagonists who were peer competi-
tors (243).
Although Lee’s thinking is clearly inºuenced by the work of sociol-
ogists and anthropologists like Bourdieu and Collins (both of whom he
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cites in his introduction), the works of scholars outside the discipline of
history are rarely referenced explicitly.1 Nonetheless, Lee’s work is more
informed by theory than is often the case with military history. Readers
with a wide range of interests—including the cultural aspects of warfare
and the debates about the value of the concepts “limited” and “total”
war, the military revolution, and the “American way of war”—will ªnd
Barbarians and Brothers rewarding reading.
Clifford J. Rogers
United States Military Academy
Human Encumbrances: Political Violence and the Great Irish Famine. By Da-
vid P. Nally (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 2011) 348
pp. $38.00
Recent work on the Irish famine has moved away from the revisionist
notion that British ofªcials cannot be faulted for their failure to relieve
Irish hunger. Instead, historians now blame laissez-faire economics.
Nally, a geographer, contributes to this literature with an interdisciplin-
ary methodology. Drawing on copious primary sources to create a sear-
ing portrayal of Irish poverty, Nally’s work is a thorough account of the
famine in a long-term perspective that places it in a contemporary theo-
retical and postcolonial framework. One great strength of this book is
that Nally embeds the famine in comparative studies, drawing on the
work of Sen and others, who demonstrate that famines are the result of
both crop failures and the inability of the poor to pay for food.1
First, Nally takes a discursive approach, demonstrating that accounts
of travelers, British ofªcials, and such intellectuals as Thomas Carlyle
created an image of the Irish people as primitive and barbaric. This is not
an original observation, but the detailed, vivid accounts of Irish poverty
that Nally quotes are useful for those who study the Irish famine. Nally
writes that the “the Irish poor emerged as objects of calculation rather
than acting subjects,” but he ignores their popular protests, a common
failing in governmentality-centered research (96).
Second, Nally uses Foucault’s paradigm of biopolitics to demon-
strate that political economy did not only involve laissez-faire, that is,
the government’s refusal to intervene, but also the government’s attempt
to reshape Irish society and landholding.2 The British imposed centraliz-
ing governmental initiatives, such as a national primary-education sys-
tem and a poor law. Nally draws on the work of postcolonial scholars to
analyze nineteenth-century Ireland as a “site for exploitation” as well as
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“a laboratory for modernity,” and he demonstrates how scholars of Ire-
land, such as McDonagh, have applied this insight to delineate the ex-
tension and centralization of government in early nineteenth-century
Ireland.3 Nally’s claim that the Irish poor law was fundamentally differ-
ent from the English poor law is an overstatement, as he later acknowl-
edges: The Irish poor law was much harsher in denying a right to relief,
but it was based on the English New Poor Law’s philosophy of limited
eligibility and placing paupers under discipline in workhouses. Once the
famine broke out, the government selectively applied laissez faire poli-
cies, for instance insisting that the Navigation Acts required exports and
imports to be carried on British ships. The task-work system was also a
way of enforcing proletarianization and labor discipline on the poor.
Finally, Nally draws on such theorists as Agamben. Generally, early
nineteenth-century politicians wanted to manage Ireland in terms of
biopolitics, imposing such discipline on the poor in order to “improve”
the economy and make Ireland more governable. However, the famine
turned Ireland into what Agamben calls a “state of exception” where
normal ethical rules did not apply.4 Nally demonstrates that British poli-
cy transformed the biopolitics of managing populations into a “necro-
politcs,” borrowing Mbembé’s phrase. The Irish were reduced to “bare
life,” in Agamben’s terms, seen as bodies superºuous to the state’s re-
quirements, who could be allowed to die. Thus did the Irish become
“human incumbrances” (230).5
Anna Clark
University of Minnesota
Captives and Corsairs: France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean.
By Gillian Weiss (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) 408 pp.
$65.00
This learned, extensive and detailed book tells the story of almost three
centuries (1550–1830) of enslavement and captivity of French nationals in
the North African Barbary Coast. During these centuries, about 1 million
Europeans were kidnapped or taken to the half-autonomous Ottoman re-
gencies of Barbary—Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoly—and to the Empire of
Morocco, held there as slaves or hostages to be ransomed. The number of
French captives in Barbary amounted to tens of thousands (the book fea-
tures a meticulous appendix of slave numbers in Barbary). The kidnapping
and enslavement of the French reached its climax during the second half
of the seventeenth century. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, it
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was mostly an “imaginative” threat to France (131). Nonetheless, the con-
quest of Algeria in 1830 was excused by the French government at the
time as a measure to end “white slavery” (156–157).
This book traces the changing responses of French society and gov-
ernment to the predicament of the French and other Europeans in Bar-
bary, and explores the shifting motivations and rationale for ransoming
and freeing the captives/slaves. These changes indicate, according to
Weiss, altering understandings within France about who was entitled to
be considered French, Christian, and even human. Whereas in the sev-
enteenth century, ransoming and anti-corsairing initiatives were subject
primarily to religious considerations and fears (for example, the fear of
forced apostasy in Barbary), in the eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
tury, the French Crown adopted a more humanistic approach, which
enabled the release not only of Catholics but also of Huguenots and
other non-French Europeans. In its turn, the practice of “white slavery”
(a category created to distinguish the European slaves in Barbary from
sub-Saharan African slaves in the New World) became so atrocious in
French eyes that despite its diminishing numerical scale, it could serve
the weak monarchical regime of Charles X as a way to gain legitimacy
for what was actually an imperialist conquest of Algeria in 1830.
Although Weiss’ book is meticulous and important, it is not partic-
ularly interdisciplinary. The book indeed deals with many important so-
cial and historical issues, but it does not conceptualize them or integrate
ideas, methods, and notions in other than a “traditional” manner. The
broad issues include state–society relations, church–state relations, and
state-building mechanisms and processes (Weiss uses the term “state
building” several times throughout the text but hardly explains what she
means by it and why certain occurrences and phenomena contributed to
it). The book is informative historically but not developed in terms of
“the general lesson” that can be drawn from it. Methodologically, it re-
lies largely on presenting and contextualizing “true accounts” of re-
deemed French slaves, redemptive religious orders’ correspondences and
documents, and French ofªcial archival materials. Because it offers no
material in Arabic or Turkish, its picture of corsairing and slavery in Bar-
bary is one-dimensional.
Although Weiss occasionally mentions the equivalent phenomenon
of kidnapping and enslaving of Muslims in France’s Mediterranean gal-
leys or the ill-treatment of Muslim diplomats and merchants in France,
the main focus of the book is the French predicament, suffering, and
policy. This approach is legitimate and understandable, but it also carries
several shortcomings. An explicit comparison between French accounts
and Barbary ones might have provided a more comprehensive under-
standing of Mediterranean slavery, of which French slavery was just a
part. But Weiss’ (lack of ) treatment of the Barbary polities risks framing
them as “natural objects” rather than as historical subjects. Similarly,
Weiss never discusses the “regencies” as political and societal entities—
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who ruled them and in what manner. Did they encourage or discourage
corsairing?
By restricting the viewpoint of the book, Weiss, though critical of
the anti-slavery argument as an excuse for the 1830 French occupation
of Algeria, reduces Barbary to an amorphous geopolitical entity/region
that acted upon France (by kidnapping its nationals) or that France acted
upon (even if for only “imaginative” reasons). She thus misses to a large
degree the mutual constitution and the complexity of Mediterranean
slavery and captivity—an intricacy acknowledged decades ago in Fer-
nand Braudel (trans. Siân Reynolds), The Mediterranean and the Mediterra-
nean World in the Age of Philip II (New York, 1972; orig. pub. Paris,
1949).
Weiss’ keeps its promise to provide new, detailed, and interesting
insights into the roots of French policy and imperialism in North Africa
during the twentieth century, as well as into France’s relations with the
Islamic world. But in so doing, it also reproduces notions about the Is-
lamic geography of danger that are prevalent even today in Western so-
ciety.
Oded Löwenheim
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and the Popular Origins of
the Transition, 1960–78. By Pamela Beth Radcliff (New York, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011) 416 pp. $95.00
This well-researched book discusses a topic about which we knew, until
now, too little. Yet it starts with an obvious mistake—that Francisco
Franco’s death occurred on October 1975 (1). It actually occurred in
November. This mistake, and other minor errors, which a good editor
should have easily detected, does not obscure the author’s achievement.
Radcliff has devoted a good deal of archival research—in often sparse
and elusive documents—as well as considerable skill, to provide a com-
prehensible, well-written, and convincingly argued portrait of how
ordinary people, and obscure and sometimes ephemeral institutions,
changed Spanish society and made the arrival of democracy possible.
Radcliff ’s search for information about such organizations, such as the
much-neglected and (often) maligned Housewives Associations, is ad-
mirable. Her use of the information that she gathered is wise and in-
sightful.
Radcliff ’s main argument is that the Francoist regime encouraged
the creation of civic associations, most notably after 1964, in an attempt
to reconnect with society. Although this policy ultimately failed, those
associations helped to school their members in both participation and di-
versity, transforming Spaniards into citizens. Some of those associations
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remained controlled by Francoist supporters well after the dictator’s
passing; others were independent; and others changed hands during the
mid-1970s. From this vantage point, Radcliff provides a different vision
of the transition to democracy in Spain during the 1970s. Although
many authors continue to focus too much on the role of the elites and
the big parties and unions, Radcliff provides a portrait of how ordinary
people in Spain have worked to improve society since the early 1960s,
within a wider process of collective political learning. Notably, she pays
attention to the women’s groups that both female and male scholars have
tended to neglect, in part because they declared themselves to be non-
feminists.
With this book, Radcliff provides historians, political scientists, and
sociologists a valuable analysis of Spain’s transition to democracy. The
fact that her documentation centers largely on Madrid, however, forces
her to omit issues speciªc to regions that not only had to cope with the
inefªciency of the Francoist authorities to address social problems but
also with the arrival of immigrants and their different cultural back-
grounds and languages. Such was the case in Catalonia (mainly Barce-
lona province) and the industrial areas of the Basque country. An analysis
of inter-community relations and the role of associations in those places
would have been a plus in what is nonetheless an excellent book.
Antonio Cazorla-Sanchez
Trent University
Venice Incognito: Masks in the Serene Republic. By James H. Johnson
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 2011) 317 pp. $39.95
Venice Incognito represents the ªrst monographic study of the history of
masks in Venice—a remarkable fact considering that the mask has long
embodied Venetian material culture. Ritual masking was a unique prac-
tice in Venice, starting as early as the thirteenth century, reaching its
height in the eighteenth century, and continuing in one way or another
to the present day. Indeed, one of the most common complaints voiced
by Venetians now is that too many local butchers and vegetable stalls
have turned into tourist mask shops, pointing to the continued presence
of the mask in the city. Johnson has brilliantly hit upon a subject that is
both at the center of Venetian life and, until now, has remained almost
untouched by Anglophone scholars.
Among the many topics that Johnson covers in the twenty-one
short chapters of his text are where, when, and why both Venetians and
visitors to the city regularly wore masks. During the eighteenth century
in particular, all of Venetian society donned masks for (a surprising) six
months of the year—a practice linked not to an extension of Carnival, as
many have long assumed, but to the Venetian theater season. Johnson
argues that on the stage, in the street, and in the infamous gambling halls
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of the city, masks did not work to disguise or create anonymity. Con-
trary to our modern understanding of masks as deceptive, masks had a
much more conservative function, “preserving distance, guarding status,
and permitting contact among unequals through ªctive concealment.
Rather than obscuring identities, masks afªrmed their permanence”
(xii).
In general, masks protected rather than altered the self, and, along
these lines, they served many speciªc functions: They guarded female
modesty at the theater, covered the pride of beggars, and allowed nobles
to mix comfortably with the underclasses and Venetian patricians to mix
with foreigners, which was otherwise prohibited by law. Thus, by offer-
ing a ªgment of anonymity, masks enabled communication among peo-
ple and groups that was otherwise forbidden. Johnson argues that, in
general, any sense of disguise was merely token; most people knew who
the person behind a mask was (206). Masking did not encourage people
to forget their identities but instead to revel in them. These conclusions
and the others Johnson draws about the tradition of masking in Venice
will prove fascinating, even to those possessing a great familiarity with
the city and its history.
Despite this strength, the text is uneven. Certain chapters present
copious new ideas and interpretations about masks. For instance, Chap-
ter 7, which explores the numerous occasions when Venetians wore
masks, is full of astonishing information (masked Venetian nobles
greeted traveling masked heads of state with masked entourages [50]—
how bizarre!), and Chapter 13 contains a compelling analysis of how
masks defended social status. Other chapters, however, cover age-old
general knowledge about the history of Venice that in no way merits
repetition. Indeed, Part I (the ªrst six chapters) discusses Venetian Car-
nival and Casanova in a way that offers little that is new and, oddly, little
about masks.
The unevenness of the book could stem from changing tides
in publishing and a desire to reach scholarly and general audiences
simultaneously—a goal that is not easy to achieve. Academic historians
of Venice, for instance, will ªnd Chapter 18—Johnson’s discussion of
Bakhtin, Davis, and the idea that Carnival functioned as a political
“safety-valve”—extremely dated, whereas a general audience might
have no interest whatsoever in such literary and anthropological theo-
ries.1 This study reveals some of the pitfalls involved in trying to straddle
this divide in readership. Nevertheless, its better chapters are genuinely
strong, providing food for further thought about the deeper meanings of
the Venetian use of masks.
Liz Horodowich
New Mexico State University
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A German Generation: An Experiential History of the Twentieth Century. By
Thomas A. Kohut (New Haven,Yale University Press, 2012) 335 pp.
$38.00
In this book, Kohut, a historian with training in psychiatry, utilizes post–
World War II interviews with sixty-two members of the Free German
Circle born between 1900 and 1926 to track how this generation came
to remember certain pivotal events and circumstances. Drawing to-
gether portions of the interviews in a series of combined memoirs and
analytical essays, Kohut recounts German history as these individuals ex-
perienced it during and right after World War I, the Weimar Republic,
the Nazi regime (including the collapse and immediate postwar years),
and the subsequent years of the Federal Republic. Given that all of the
people interviewed became enthusiastic supporters of the Nazi regime—
at least in the beginning—the author does not come to like them. He
tries, however, to take them at their word, while remaining sensitive to
the issues of deriving accurate and realistic understanding from the prod-
ucts of oral history.
In part because these individuals met at regular intervals to discuss
personal experiences and current events, they shared great commonali-
ties in their views, at least by gender. Those readers who are interested
in German women’s history will ªnd Kohut’s examination of gender
distinctions particularly interesting. Kohut explores more than just the
vast, and hardly surprising, differences between the struggles of men,
broken and defeated in their return from prisoner-of-war status, and of
women at home to re-establish some semblance of normality after Ger-
many’s defeat in World War II. Other noteworthy aspects of the gender
issue surface in his accounts, such as the ways in which men’s and
women’s evaluation of their labor-service experience diverged.
Common views about the turmoil in Germany after World War I, a
desire for group identity, and an attraction for the Nazi movement—
especially the labor service that the new government required—come to
the fore in all of the interviews, as well as a real or pretended fear of the
secret police (although, as is now well known, the German public essen-
tially policed itself ). A sense of group cohesion encouraged many Ger-
mans to look down on others and to look away when others, espe-
cially Jews, were persecuted. In the end, all of the interviewees saw
themselves as victims of developments in which they themselves played
no part.
Kohut’s juxtaposition of interviews and analyses allows readers to
ponder the main issues before the author presents his own deductions.
This fruitful procedure highlights the generational divide between the
interviewees in the postwar Federal Republic. A map of wartime Ger-
many would have been helpful (and would have spared the author the
error of placing Auschwitz in the Warthegau [163]). Kohut is particu-
larly careful and convincing in showing how the interviewees turned
their eyes and their memories away from the Holocaust. He might also
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have noted their disregard of the comparative successes of the Weimar
Republic, which avoided total occupation of the country; saw the occu-
pation end twelve, rather than forty-nine, years after the war; entered
the international organization, the League of Nations, eight, rather than
twenty-eight, years after defeat; acquired a permanent position on the
League council; and so forth. But these are minor quibbles with a book
that is both innovative and revealing.
Gerhard L. Weinberg
University of North Carolina
Taming the Prophets: Astrology, Orthodoxy and the Word of God in Early
Modern Sweden. By Martin Kjellgren (Lund, SekelBokförlag, 2011)
332 pp. N.P.
This tidy, modest, and clearly written book contextualizes a Swedish at-
tempt of 1619 to de-legitimize astrological prognostications. Kjellgren
recounts the persecution of Sigfrid Forsius, a moderately successful
mathematician and almanac producer from Finland, by a commission
(technically, an “inquisition”) that included a “scientiªc” expert—a for-
mer professor of astronomy and almanac maker, who had become a
bishop in Sweden’s anxiously confessional and royally controlled Lu-
theran establishment.
Forsius, the author of no fewer than twenty-seven publications be-
tween 1602 and 1623—nearly all of them in Swedish (listed on 306–
308)—is the most interesting character in this story. He was Sweden’s
ªrst author specializing in almanacs—which were rare until 1600—
eventually becoming sufªciently well-known for his “name [to be] used
as a sales pitch even after his death” (278). But this apparently autodidact
Finnish-born cleric was an incorrigible Bohemian, described as an “an-
noying and restless man” or as “restless, unruly, and irresponsible” (209,
215). His censors were not exaggerating. Forsius’ escapades include ser-
vice in Estonia as an army chaplain in both 1599 and 1616; a border-
mapping expedition to Lapland in 1601/02; an arrest in Finland in 1606;
and serious quarrels with, and long separations from, his wife. A guest
was once killed after a drunken brawl in their house.
Laurentius Paulius Gothus, the other main ªgure, published eleven
works between 1591 and 1636 (the ªrst two being almanacs), while ob-
taining high rewards after steering successfully through the dangerous
waters of a state church in ºux (309–310). En route, he appeared to
change positions about the utility of astrological prognostications be-
tween his early almanacs and his role in de-legitimizing Forsius in 1619.
However, Kjellgren argues, the censure of Forsus had much less to do
with the permissibility of astrological forecasts in almanacs than with
simply silencing an embarrassing clerical “black-sheep”: “There are no
new arguments raised against astrology, only a new inclination to deªne
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the efforts of astrologers as illicit” (257). As late as 1636, notes Kjellgren,
Paulius still offered a limited defense of astrology’s usefulness in medi-
cine and agriculture (286).
This book contains some interesting sections about how Swedish
Lutheran astronomy and astrology encountered the Gregorian calendar
reform and a comparison between Forsius’ and Paulinus’ commentaries
on a comet in 1607 (122–127,164–172), but it offers no genuinely inter-
disciplinary approach and rarely ventures beyond the northernmost mar-
gins of a deeply confessionalized Europe. Forsius notwithstanding, Swe-
den in 1619 seems to have been a kinder and gentler place than England,
where a 1603 regulation threatened that authors of “prophecies exceed-
ing the limits of allowable astrology shall be punished severely in their
persons” (25). Sweden also seems to have been a universe apart from
post-Tridentine Italy, where Galileo was investigated by the Roman In-
quisition in 1600 for making excessive claims about the predictions of his
horoscopes and twenty years later circulated a letter to the dowager
grand duchess of Tuscany arguing that mathematically demonstrated as-
tronomical truths took precedence over Scriptural texts.
William Monter
Northwestern University
Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Effectiveness in World War II.
By Roger Reese (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2011) 386 pp.
$37.50
“The Red Army was at all times militarily effective,” although it “simul-
taneously fought quite inefªciently” (306). By “effectiveness,” Reese
means “the ability of an army to sustain battle” (3). Supported by the
public as a whole, Soviet forces performed poorly on many occasions
but never lost the ability to ªght the Germans.
Soviet citizens served or evaded duty for many reasons. Reese uses
published memoirs, archival sources, and recollections available online
to show that although some soldiers rejected Stalinism, most fought for
the socialist system and for Stalin. Even those who had directly suffered
in the prewar years generally did not perceive “evil intent on the part of
Stalin or see them [repression, dekulakization, etc.] as inherent to the
economic and social systems” (13). Injustices were instead ascribed to
Stalin’s underlings.
Red Army troops fought because of loyalty to Russia; “normal
obedience to the state”; the conviction that resisting the invasion was a
“just war”; the belief, especially of young people, that the postrevo-
lutionary generation now faced a great historical task; the understanding
that Nazi rule would not improve life; and self-interest, the idea that ser-
vice might improve one’s personal situation (10).
Patriotism did not necessarily equate with support for Stalinist gov-
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ernance; people can and do ªght for regimes they dislike. By the same
token, surrender or desertion from the Red Army resulted from various
motives and situational factors, not always disloyalty. Reese argues that
coercion in securing service has been overrated. He details the large
number of volunteers from the major cities and compares their willing-
ness to ªght to the evaporation of self-sacriªce during World War I.
Few Soviet volunteers came from the peasantry, but when the army be-
came “repeasantized” in 1942 after horrendous losses among urban sol-
diers, the armed forces remained effective.
The book counters ideas—often based on remarks by former Ger-
man soldiers—that Soviet troops behaved like animals or automatons in
battle. Reese shows instead that Soviet soldiers largely acted on their
own initiative, deciding for themselves why they fought. Political
ofªcers often conducted little indoctrination; rather, they explained to
untested men what they should expect in battle. Reese also corrects the
record concerning blocking detachments. Contrary to legend, they did
not ªre machine guns at retreating troops. The detachments were not
even designed to intimidate soldiers. Bearing only small arms, they
rounded up stragglers and disorganized, retreating men and returned
them to the front. The blocking attachments arrested only 3.7 per-
cent of the soldiers that they detained, and only 1.5 percent of the de-
tainees received death sentences (170). The penal battalions, in which
casualties could be extremely high, did not mean permanent punish-
ment; service in them sometimes lasted only several days. Survivors usu-
ally returned to their original units and ranks. Little evidence suggests
that women soldiers and support troops ever failed in action; despite
horrendous conditions and sexual harassment, women were “vital” to
Soviet success.
Reese could have given more emphasis to German air superiority in
1941/42. The invaders bombed and strafed at will and detected forma-
tions approaching the front, greatly damaging Red Army morale and
performance. Furthermore, the book can be excessively conceptual.
Why divide those who obeyed to “the point of self-sacriªce” into “sol-
dier-philosophers” or “soldier-victims” (131)? When troops were sur-
rounded and bombed, shelled, and cut apart by armor; when they ran
out of ammunition, food, and water in the summer heat; no theoretical
explanation for surrender is needed. Thankfully, readers can easily cut
though this occasional foliage.
Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought makes an excellent contribution to the
literature about the Soviet people’s response to World War II and Stalin-
ism. Simplistic notions about glorious patriotism or pervasive disloyalty
are unhelpful. Reese instead introduces a variety of human motivations,
emotions, and responses to the war and to the regime.
Robert W. Thurston
Miami University
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Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics. By Stephen
Collier (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011) $70.00 cloth
$26.95 paper
Collier’s treatment of Russia’s neoliberal experience in Post-Soviet Social
is a subtle and empirically grounded conceptual discussion of neoliberal-
ism that invigorates a debate that has became rather stale. Rather than
take the easy path of accepting neoliberalism as a coherent doctrine
backed by corporate interests to gut the state, Collier borrows from
Foucault’s methodological orientations and paints a much more com-
plex and convincing picture of neoliberalism in practice, with all of its
contradictions and compromises on full display.1 One of the most pro-
found contributions of the manuscript is to rescue the work of Stigler
and Buchanan from those on the political right who use it to cham-
pion shrinking the state. Collier reminds us all that Stigler’s “Theory of
Regulation” is just as critical of the excessive inºuence of corporate in-
terests on policymaking, which is the essence of Stigler’s capture theory
of regulation. In addition, Collier highlights the central role of redistri-
bution between rich and poor regions in Buchanan’s work on ªscal fed-
eralism.2
Given the prominence that Buchanan and the “Virginia” school
and Stigler and the “Chicago” school had in the right’s reconstruction of
neoliberal thought, Collier’s insights suggest a much more equivocal re-
lationship between the intellectual founding fathers of neoliberalism and
its current champions. Collier’s insights on Stigler and Buchanan also
force critics of neoliberalism from the left to reassess their assumptions
about neoliberalism as an uncompromising and coherent line of thought
underpinned by a desire to elevate corporate over public interests at all
costs and by any means necessary. Without a doubt, the debate about
neoliberalism has been highly politicized, divorced from its intellectual
roots, and stripped of empirical analysis in recent years. Collier’s work
provides just the right approach to advance the discussion.
Yet Collier is not satisªed to simply cast the argument in theoretical
terms. Instead, he proceeds to demonstrate how uneasily thinly drawn
accounts of neoliberalism by both the right and the left square with the
Russian case. His treatment of economic reform in the single-company
towns of Belaya Kalitva and Rodniki in the last ªfteen or so years paints
a rich picture that supports his account on both the micro- and macro-
level. On the micro-level, he describes the wrenching experience of the
1990s in the two factory towns with a clear eye. Attributing the causes of
the upheaval in everyday life to both the failure of Soviet planning and
the mismatch between economic reforms and Soviet-style infrastruc-
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ture, Collier describes how Soviet decisions on heating and budgetary
policy continued to inºuence social life and economic outcomes in the
post-Soviet era. A perfect example is his treatment of heating pipes in
apartments. A standard neoliberal approach to heating reform would
prescribe the installation of individual meters for each apartment so that
costs could be traced to individual decisions. However, because Soviet
planners attached many apartments to a single boiler, the costs of switch-
ing from collective to individual metering of heat were prohibitive. This
institutional constraint signiªcantly raised the costs of heating reform in
a post-Soviet environment relative to other settings.
Collier is also cognizant of the high politics of neoliberalism and
draws an equally convincing picture of the evolution of the views of the
World Bank and Western neoliberal academics who initially emphasized
the macro-economic elements of transformation—privatization, stabili-
zation, and liberalization—but then emphasized building institutions
and adjusting their policies in light of continuing technological and po-
litical constraints. His depiction of the changing tasks of neoliberal re-
form over time provides a convincing rebuttal to those who view the
reform agenda as immutable and driven solely by ideology and corporate
interests.
These positive points would be enough for a good book, but Col-
lier goes further. In the ªrst half of the book, he situates his argument
within the long-standing literatures in Sovietology and urban planning.
He engages with geographers, political scientists, and historians of the
U.S.S.R. who have emphasized the Soviet leadership’s penchant for big
projects, which some have labeled “gigantomania.” Without downplay-
ing the incentives built into Soviet-style socialism to favor large projects,
Collier also identiªes the critical role played by small and medium-sized
industrial cities, which, contrary to much common wisdom, were actu-
ally overrepresented in the U.S.S.R. He focuses on city planning, again
unwilling to accept the terms of the debate uncritically. Although he ac-
knowledges the dominant view that city plans were rarely met, often
contradictory, and subject to sabotage by powerful industrial ministries,
he nonetheless shows that the plans were able to create a public sphere
between workplaces and the state. For all of their deªciencies, city plans
helped to implant the infrastructure of the modern city in Russia in a
distinctly Soviet fashion. But rather than concentrate on demonstrating
the “uniqueness” of the impact of city planning in Russia, Collier also
expertly traces how it molded social life in the late Soviet period and
continued to shape Russia’s engagement with liberal reforms into the
twenty-ªrst century.
A less ambitious scholar could easily have taken these two projects
and split them into two books. But by treating them under one cover,
Collier manages to show how past decisions shape the present in far
more detail than is usually the case.
Timothy Frye
Columbia University
Higher School of Economics-Russia
Na ceste k modernej zene: Kapitoly z dejín rodovãch vzt’ahov na Slovensku
(Toward the Modern Woman: Chapters from the History of Family
Relations in Slovakia). Edited by Gabriela Dudeková et al. (Bratislava,
Veda, 2011) 773 pp. $30.00
Western historians have been working on gender issues for decades; rel-
atively little is known, however, about the history of women in Central
Europe.1 Under Communism, Czechoslovak, East German, and Hun-
garian women enjoyed constitutionally guaranteed equality with men
and the right to work. Yet, society conceived of their role as the tradi-
tional one of mother and wife; occupied with family matters during
their entire lives, women took care of their grandchildren after retire-
ment.
Einhorn and Waylen vividly described how the political change of
1989 affected women who were marginalized by the new democratic
and economic spirit.2 Women were the ªrst to lose their jobs when the
privatization of state-owned enterprises began in the 1990s. Another
new development was the hitherto unknown phenomenon of sexism.
The import of the Western concept of liberty certainly introduced
Berlin’s two freedoms—freedom from state oppression and freedom to
engage in matters common to all, for example, building the polity with
the democratic vote.3 But negative phenomena also insinuated their way
into the Central European post-totalitarian societies—criminality, por-
nography, greed, ruthless selªshness, and asocial behavior. A sad conse-
quence of the regime change has been the trafªcking of young Eastern
European women, who apply for a job in the rich West and often land
in brothels, where they are forced into prostitution.4
Feminism was not popular under Communism. Havel, the most
prominent dissident of Charter 77, explained in 1985 that Czechoslovak
women considered feminism as “dada, the fear of becoming uninten-
tionally ridiculous when publicly addressing women’s oppression by
men.”5 To a society that oppressed the civil and political rights of all,
women’s issues were neither interesting nor of vital importance.
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A new historiography free from ideological constraints, as well
as the fear of embarrassment, might explain the skepticism about the
feminist approach to historiography: Central European scholars started
only in the mid-1990s to investigate women’s roles and functions in
society.6 Given this background, Toward the Modern Woman is a unique
contribution to Slovak and Central European historiography. Its inter-
disciplinary methodology combines analysis of social history, ethnology,
art history, literature, historical anthropology, and sociology. The book
presents a chronological account of Slovak women’s lives from the
eighteenth to the twentieth century in a Central European context, re-
ferring to the Austrian, Czech, German, and Hungarian women’s
movements.7
The ªne fabric of social historiography is one of the volume’s stron-
gest points. It conveys a vivid picture of the motives, goals, ideas, and
everyday reality of Slovak women, who, in the nineteenth century,
found themselves in a catch-22. On the one hand, they were eager to
engage in gender issues—for example, an attempt to establish educa-
tional institutions for girls. On the other hand, they shared men’s view
that the political situation demanded the nation’s unity to resist the
Magyar assimilation. Emancipation in the Western understanding of the
freedom to choose how to spend one’s life would have meant ªghting a
battle on two fronts—ªrst, against the domination of men and, second,
against political oppression.8
Slovak women had neither the ªnancial means nor the political
clout to redress either affront. Moreover, any desire to promote feminist
issues was complicated by their particular understanding of feminism and
emancipation: “The fact that the Slovak women’s movement was weak
and lacked decisiveness, indeed, that it was too modest, tells us more
about the general conservatism ruling in Slovak society than the conser-
vative orientation of Slovak women. . . . The representatives of the Slo-
vak women’s movement were also convinced that, in the long run, a
policy of small steps would be more successful than immediate radical
actions.”9
After an introductory chapter on Slovak family relations, Chapter 2,
“The Ideal Picture,” deals with gender stereotypes and normative val-
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ues of womanhood and manhood in the early nineteenth century—the
traditional idealized perception of women as wives and mothers (19–
127). Chapter 3, “The Ways of Emancipation,” focuses on the begin-
nings of the women’s movement in the second half of that century; it
highlights the crucial importance of the opening up of the public sphere,
contextualizing women’s public appearances in the national spolky, and
the various cultural-national associations (choirs; reading circles; and the
ªrst women’s association, known as Zivena).10 Women’s main activities
were social care, welfare, literature, and the teaching of cooking and
sewing. The education of girls was not a burning issue, since a labor
market for women did not yet exist.11 Few women engaged in the inter-
national women’s movement; the majority still adhered to the conserva-
tive view of “faith, modesty, industriousness and also passivity” for
women.12
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, “The Real Picture,” explore the con-
sequences of the social change in the early twentieth century, which
allowed women to enter politics and professional life. Rich in detail,
the contributions include the importance of sport as well as women’s le-
gal and social status in the authoritarian First Slovak Republic and dur-
ing the Holocaust and the communist regime (147–423). Chapter 5,
“The Vocation of Women,” emphasizes the entry of women into the
modern professions of lawyer, teacher, journalist, editor, and artist (551–
616).
Chapter 6 presents professional biographies, illustrating the career of
the ªrst female doctor of medicine, a university lecturer in medicine,
and a pastor (631–684). In the conclusion, Dudeková presents a sum-
mary of the research results, identifying the intrinsic connection be-
tween national and female emancipation as the main reason for the
feminist movement’s weakness: “Society assigned to the mothers the ed-
ucational task of instilling in the children confessional and ethnic iden-
tity. This very task opened up the area of education to women, which
was the basis for their further emancipation and self-realization. A com-
parison of the histories of female emancipation in the lands of the former
Habsburg Empire shows that the building of a modern nation and aspi-
rations for an independent state were at the centre of attention [of each
national group].”13 Such was the reason why modest contacts between
Slovak feminists and the international women’s movement emerged
shortly before World War I. Constitutional equality had to await the
democratic system of the Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938), which
granted human rights and instituted higher education for girls, laying the
grounds for future gender equality.
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Toward the Modern Woman features meticulous scholarship, a sound
interdisciplinary method, and a critical approach to key concepts and
normative values. A minor criticism concerns its length. Although the
overall structure of the volume is sound, an edition in two volumes
might have been more manageable. Nonetheless, the strong social-
scientiªc methodology of this volume has resulted in a seminal reference
book for Central European gender studies and women’s history. One
can only hope that it will be translated into English and German soon.
Josette Baer
University of Zurich
Separated by Their Sex: Women in Public and Private in the Colonial Atlantic
World. By Mary Beth Norton (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2011)
247 pp. $29.95
This book is characteristic of Norton’s many works—insightful, rich,
bold, and lucid. It is the second (though written last) of a trilogy now
completed, tracking ideals of femininity and gender from the early colo-
nial period—Founding Mothers and Fathers: Gendered Power and the
Forming of American Society (New York, 1996))—to the Revolutionary
era—Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women,
1750–1800 (Boston, 1980). This trilogy represents an extraordinary life-
time’s work for a proliªc, brilliant, and path-breaking historian; it will
doubtless remain on reading lists for decades to come.
In Separated by Their Sex, Norton tracks the rise of the idea of “sepa-
rate spheres” in which women were excluded from the public realm and
relegated to the private one. Evidently, the turning point was the early
eighteenth century, when English print culture (and its male authors)
popularized this bifurcation. Although much recent scholarship has
spent time demolishing the walls between private and public, Norton
instead focuses on making the separation historically contingent, trying
to pinpoint precisely when and how the language of politics excluding
women (even elite ones) came to dominate.
To answer the question, Norton consulted a wide array of printed
and manuscript sources on both sides of the Atlantic. She also delved
into literary works, including notable periodicals like The Athenian Mer-
cury and The Spectator, making her study valuable for literary scholars as
well as historians. This book is the most thoroughly and self-consciously
centered on the Atlantic of any of her works (notwithstanding the Lon-
don-based research for her early work about Loyalists). The chapters al-
ternate colonial situations and sources with English ones, moving
through time from the pre-watershed seventeenth century into the post-
watershed mid-eighteenth century, with interludes that focus on partic-
ular women, assessing the “take up” of the new gender regime. This
structure generally works well. Indeed, many of the interludes, such as
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those about Mistress Alice Tilly and Sarah Kemble Knight, are captivat-
ing in themselves.
Chapter 1 focuses on Lady Frances Berkeley’s role in Bacon’s Re-
bellion in Virginia during the 1670s. Norton contends that, as wife of
the governor and cousin of Nathaniel Bacon, she was “an important
state actor” (10). Norton uses Lady Frances’ interventions in the rebel-
lion to depict a seventeenth-century world in which rank and status still
trumped gender. Although many contemporaries criticized the nature of
Lady Frances’ involvement, no one appeared to question whether she
should or could involve herself in state politics.
Chapter 2 moves across the Atlantic to women’s novel collective
petitioning during the English Civil War. Like Lady Frances, these
women provoked criticism but, Norton argues, more because of the
substance of their petitions, or their nonelite rank, than for their political
action per se. This chapter offers ingenuous and persuasive close readings
of women’s petitions and satires about them.
The next two chapters ªx on that moment in the eighteenth cen-
tury when, according to Norton, gender began to trump rank. Ex-
ploring the print culture of England at the time—especially John Dun-
ton’s The Athenian Mercury (and its advice letters to readers) and Joseph
Addison and Richard Steele’s The Spectator and The Tatler—she con-
tends that “John Dunton thus in 1702 outlined what became the mod-
ern Western world’s division of labor between men and women, devel-
oping both the public/private split in its modern form and laying out the
ªrst deªnition of separate spheres” [italics in original] (103). She argues
persuasively for the prevalence of works like The Spectator in the colo-
nies. An interlude on the politically well-connected Lady Chatham,
Hester Grenville Pitt, and her correspondents implies that women, tak-
ing the lessons of such authors to heart, became increasingly apologetic
for even mentioning politics in personal letters.
The ªnal section investigates how both men and women came to
emphasize the private sphere as female. This section includes discussions
of newspaper articles purportedly written by women, most of which ei-
ther relegated women to the private sphere or satirized them for leaving
it. She also looks brieºy at the arrangements of space in elite houses, as
well as the ways in which women came to dominate one section of
them—the room with the tea tables.
Notwithstanding the elegant readings and the compelling analyses
to be found throughout the book, many readers will be left wanting
more. Some of them may feel that Norton might have been chosen a
wider range of evidence—and women—to ºesh out her argument. His-
torians of Great Britain, many of whom have led the way in studies of
masculinity, may desire more coverage of masculine roles, which seem
surely to be part of the solution to this conundrum. Doubtless, however,
they will learn a great deal about colonial developments. Historians of
early America, meanwhile, may be a little sorry that Norton did not pur-
sue further the kinds of issues to which she alluded suggestively in the
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ªrst part of the trilogy—“dramatic changes beginning in the mid-1670s,
the most signiªcant of which were the rapid expansion of slavery and
major alterations in the colonies’ relationships with nearby Indians,”
as well as the “growing commercialization of New England” (Found-
ing Mothers, 15). Yet for them, much of the discussion about English
developments—with spotlights on women’s Civil War petitions and
popular periodicals—will be welcome.
Both kinds of historians can be grateful to Norton for bestowing re-
newed attention to the critical but neglected period of the early eigh-
teenth century, despite the fact that she does not fully explain what
caused the changes that she tracks so adeptly. Given Norton’s extraordi-
nary achievements as a historian, it is curious to ªnd her so reticent. She
notes several possible explanations (from Laqueur’s theories about two
sexes to controversies surrounding Queen Anne and her female favor-
ites), but she does not ªrmly advocate any of them.1 Perhaps her unex-
pectedly modest approach indicates the wisdom of experience, as well as
an understandable unwillingness to enter into complex long-standing
controversies among English historians.
Nevertheless, if so marvelous a historian of women and gender as
Norton cannot tell us why these changes occurred, who in the world
can? Few are better placed to elucidate the why as well as the how, despite
the extremely absorbing story that she offers. Maybe this excellent tril-
ogy should become a quartet. The history of women will surely be the
better for it. In the meantime, this fascinating book provides a thought-
provoking and engrossing interpretation of a critical cultural moment.
Sarah M. S. Pearsall
Oxford Brookes University
The Politics of Fashion in Eighteenth-Century America. By Kate Haulman
(Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2011) 304 pp. $39.95
When Britain’s Prince William and his wife Catherine, Duchess of
Cambridge, visited the United States, the American press leaped to ask,
“Are pantyhose back?” First Lady Michele Obama drew criticism for
wearing a gown by a British designer to a White House dinner, and the
Weatherproof Garment Company launched an impromptu marketing
campaign after seeing a photo of President Obama in one of its jackets.
Politics and fashion are today deeply intertwined nowadays, but Haul-
man informs us that fashion and politics were no less braided at the na-
tion’s founding; in fact, this symbiosis was integral to the new republic’s
creation.
Haulman’s thoroughgoing look at the place of fashion in public dis-
course focuses on consumption and display among the urban popula-
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tions of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. She “consid-
ers fashion both as a concept, a shape-shifting vessel of an idea that
people ªll up with various meanings depending on time, place, and cir-
cumstance, and as changing styles of personal adornment, whether la
mode or other modes of the day” (3).
The volume is arranged in three parts, which together cover the en-
tire eighteenth century. Part I attends to ways in which clothing shaped
and reºected “hierarchies of rank and categories of gender” in the early
eighteenth century, and offers examples of how people set, enforced,
and violated expectations (7). Hoops and periwigs, in particular, marked
moments of crisis in gender relations as fashion became increasingly
feminized.
Part II turns to the imperial crises of the 1760s and 1770s, when
fashion—and the imported goods on which it depended—became a
hot-button issue, and mid-century rhetoric around frugality and sim-
plicity became increasingly shrill. As fashion more and more proclaimed
political loyalty, hair heaped in the “high roll” and “Macaroni” men
(men of high fashion by way of Italy on the Grand Tour) drew especial
scorn. In Part III, Haulman turns to Revolutionary Philadelphia, espe-
cially the “military mode, where fashion and politics merged most ex-
plicitly” (157), and soldiers sought to strike just the right note in appear-
ance, “formidable but not foppish” (161). Americans in the emerging
nation struggled to reconcile these and other competing demands—style
and substance, luxury and necessity, and emulation and independence.
Finally, as the new polity reached the turn of the century, the “tri-
umph of masculine sartorial simplicity signaled the political emergence
of a cross-class coalition of white men, voters and leaders, legitimated
through, and yet regardless of fashion.” “Formal politics, at least in the-
ory, became a fashion-free realm of power and legitimacy,” and the
“paradox in which fashion was good for a nation’s political economy but
bad for society was resolved” (9). Like contemporary calls for energy in-
dependence, which seek to disentangle our government and economy
from the complications associated with fuel suppliers abroad, these calls
for sartorial independence sought to ensure the ºedgling nation’s sur-
vival.
Specialists in the history of fashion and consumption will encounter
much that is familiar in this book, as Haulman capably synthesizes the
truly impressive amount of scholarship about clothing, consumption,
and fashion produced in recent years. Moreover, her own research gen-
erates fresh insights, allowing her to posit new trajectories that, among
other things, help to explain the “great divergence” of the early nine-
teenth century, when elite men’s fashion retreated into the plain dark
suits that still prevail today, while women’s fashion continued (and con-
tinues) to respond to much broader swings in color and cut.
Though costume historians will question some of the analysis re-
garding the speciªcs of construction and materials, Haulman’s engaging
approach to a broad range of sources, including visual and material cul-
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ture and some particularly intriguing attention to the grammar of adver-
tisements, makes for fascinating reading. Historians of eighteenth-
century culture will ªnd much of value to enrich their own scholarship
in history as well as gender studies, and, furthermore, they will gain a
heightened awareness of the many ways in which fashion has long
swirled through American political life before, during, and after the age
of Revolution.
Marla R. Miller
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
The Nation’s Nature: How Continental Presumptions Gave Rise to the United
States of America. By James D. Drake (Charlottesville, University of Vir-
ginia Press, 2011) 416 pp. $39.50
How did the United States get to be so big? How did thirteen rebellious
British provinces, strung along the Atlantic seaboard, create a dynamic
union that could expand across the continent? Focusing on the character
of the new regime, historians and political theorists have wondered how
the founders could have resolved the conundrum of the “extended re-
public.” Montesquieu had taught them that republics, animated by the
“virtue” of an engaged citizenry, had to be small; the larger the polity,
the greater was the need for the despotic rule of a powerful monarch.1
Drake argues persuasively that we have been looking for answers to
these questions in all the wrong places. The frustrated imperial patriots
who became revolutionaries thought “big” from the outset. North
America was “a uniªed, natural phenomenon, a single and unique geo-
graphical entity,” and the destiny of the original thirteen colonies—
within or outside the Empire—was to dominate the continent (87). The
challenge was not to move from small to big but the reverse: Anglo-
American imperialists “had the conceptual grammar to appropriate the
continent if only it could overcome their countervailing language of
provincialism” (80).
As they mobilized resistance to British authority, patriot leaders
turned to the “people,” thus unleashing the radical, democratic impulses
that sometimes seemed to threaten their own authority. The solution
was to draft new constitutions, grounded in popular sovereignty, at the
state and federal levels. Federalists ªnally triumphed in the ratiªcation
debates, despite the Montesquiean concerns of skeptics about the im-
mensity of the union and the danger of “consolidation,” because they
had nature—and therefore, perhaps, God—on their side. “Only an ‘un-
natural voice’ would suggest that Americans could not have a strong
continental union” (295). After all, the states to which fearful
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Antifederalists were so attached were mere “artiªces of British rule . . .
not natural communities” (304).
Drake’s reconstruction of the “geography of the mind” gives us a
fresh perspective on the origins and development of American democ-
racy. The meaning of “equality” itself was shaped by geographical un-
derstandings, as constitution writers moved toward “apportionment
based on population,” displacing the presumably “equal” citizens from
their “local circumstances” and making them “interchangeable” (296).
Drake characterizes this move from “locally oriented to metageograph-
ical conceptions of space” as a return to the “virtual representation” of
the old imperial regime; “with the ratiªcation of the Constitution . . .
virtual representation became the law of an extended republic” (307).
This assumption, however, seems tendentious, suggesting that the
founders betrayed the Revolution’s democratic promise of “actual” rep-
resentation in local, presumably more “natural communities.” For better
or worse, Americans’ democratic aspirations would not be contained
within little villages or small republics. “Casting themselves during the
Revolution as a continent rejecting island rule,” Americans “waged a
war not just for colonial liberation; they had fought to assume their mas-
ter’s imperial mantle” (283). In their empire, mobile, colonizing (white)
Americans would certainly be secure in their rights, including the right
to actually participate in politics, wherever they came from.2
Drake’s account of the metageographical origins of American na-
tionhood is compelling: The Revolutionaries’ “continental conscious-
ness” enabled Americans to imagine themselves as a single people and
the continent as their natural “home.” Drake’s handling of the ratiªca-
tion debates would have beneªted, however, from more attention to
the Confederation’s geopolitical situation. Revolutionaries may not
have feared descending into an anarchic “political state of nature” when
they severed “ties with Britain,” as Drake writes, because their conti-
nent seemed to have an inherent, natural “order” (155). But North
America’s supposed advantages over Europe, where “natural subdivi-
sions” gave rise to “numerous peoples” who were constantly at war, no
longer seemed obvious as the Confederation began to collapse and the
disunited states faced the prospect of a Europeanized future (34).
In The Federalist, Hamilton demolished the idea that republics were
naturally peaceful, “the deceitful dream of a golden age,” and that a
strong continental government was therefore not necessary.3 Americans
needed what Hendrickson calls a “peace pact” to protect the “infant
empire” from internal as well as external threats and to guarantee its as-
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cent to greatness (283).4 Failing to fulªll nature’s promise, Federalists
warned, the new nation would prove to be no nation at all.
Peter Onuf
University of Virginia
An Archaeology of Desperation: Exploring the Donner Party’s Alder Creek
Camp. Edited by Kelly J. Dixon, Julie M. Schablitsky, and Shannon A.
Novak (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2011) 384 pp. $34.95
The overall aim of this edited volume is to employ a multidisciplinary or
“holistic” approach to answer some of the lingering questions surround-
ing the sensational stories of survival, including cannibalism, associated
with the Donner Party. The editors gathered a diverse group of ex-
perts—historical archaeologists; social, physical, and biological anthro-
pologists; and historians—to provide a broad, comparative, social and
material context with which to gain a new perspective on the people in-
volved. The contributors draw their evidence from material culture dis-
carded during the encampment, faunal remains, and written and oral
histories. Much of what is known about the Donner Party rests on hear-
say, rumors, and partial memories. Prior to archaeological research,
much of the material remains were said to be removed from the camps
by what the editors refer to as souvenir hunters and travelers. Thus, a
good portion of the book confronts the well-known master narrative of
what transpired within the Donner Party.
The book is divided into four sections; each section has its own
theme. The contributors succeed in their intention to humanize the
Donner Party, or at least to understand the experiences of, and choices
made by, this group of pioneers comprised as it was of men, women,
children, immigrants and natives—Catholics and Protestants, as well as
members of the middle and laboring classes. The contributors view Vic-
torian etiquette, mores, beliefs, and societal rules as deeply implicated in
what happened to the Donner Party. They argue that this context, as
well as the Industrial Revolution and the changing market economy, are
necessary for a proper understanding of these people. To their credit, the
contributors are able to demonstrate the relevance of these cultural trap-
pings to the Party through attention to the material remains. Artifacts
like tea cups and dinner plates that might have been found in countless
homes across the United States reºect the Party’s typical middle-class
domesticity.
Overall, the book is coherent and well written, with something to
offer a diverse readership. It does not so much correct the standard leg-
end of cannibalism as provide a broader context for it. The archaeologi-
cal and historical research reveals the stresses and structures of the people
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in the Donner Party as not far removed from those of Victorian society,
helping to explicate their choices when they became stranded in the
mountains. On the whole, the book is a great resource for comparative
archaeological data, with much of interest about both material culture
and theory.
Stephen Brighton
University of Maryland
Unprotected Labor: Household Workers, Politics, and Middle-Class Reform in
New York, 1870–1940. By Vanessa H. May (Chapel Hill, University of
North Carolina Press, 2011) $65.00 cloth $26.95 paper
Women’s movements in the United States have always been plagued by
class tensions. As May’s new book vividly illustrates, campaigns for the
rights of domestic workers most clearly highlight the conºicting goals
and competing values among women. May’s book deftly depicts the
contradictions faced by middle-class women who championed labor
protections for factory workers but who resisted similar protections for
women employed in their own homes. As a consequence, domestic
workers were (and still are) largely left untouched by the twentieth cen-
tury’s social “safety net.” “Women’s organizations’ ambivalence about
state regulation of the middle-class home,” she says, “contributed to the
failure to bring basic labor standards to domestic workers in the New
Deal” (144).
Domestic work was the largest sector of women’s employment un-
til World War II ended, employing large numbers of immigrants as well
as African Americans. Middle-class women continually debated the
“servant question,” but relatively few of them wanted to address the
conditions of work in their own homes. The discussion of domestic ser-
vice, May argues, turned the middle-class home “inside out” by con-
verting the home into a workplace and threatening even the most in-
trepid women’s-rights reformers’ notions of what constituted the public
(versus the private) realm. Mainstream women reformers, particularly
during the early twentieth century, justiªed their claims to public partic-
ipation on the basis of their special roles and duties as mothers. This
“maternalism,” which informed signiªcant social-policy initiatives even
into the time of the New Deal, rested on a notion of the home as a
“gendered private space rather than a workplace” (145). Thus, May con-
tends, “allowing the government to regulate domestic service would
challenge progressive women’s authority” to advocate for other female
workers (145).
Certain Progressive Era reformers, most notably Florence Kellor,
tried to address the plight of servants through government regulation.
These efforts included the development of licensed employment agen-
cies and domestic training programs, but signiªcantly, they did not go
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so far as to regulate conditions within servants’ actual workplace—the
middle-class home. Most reform efforts aimed at transforming the be-
havior of domestics (combining housekeeping skills with deportment,
bible classes, and grooming lessons) or the behavior of unscrupulous
agents. Kellor pushed for public policies that would regulate employ-
ment agencies and mediate disputes among employers, domestics, and
the agencies. Although such reforms aided some domestics, they did lit-
tle to address the balance of power between employers and domestics,
and they did nothing to regulate the hours, wages, and working condi-
tions in middle-class homes. Like other Progressive reformers, May ar-
gues, Kellor cast the “servant problem” as one of “municipal manage-
ment and urban reform rather than as a labor problem” (105).
One of the virtues of May’s work is her attempt to give as much
voice to domestic workers themselves as to their middle-class employers.
Though hindered by signiªcant source limitations, May nonetheless
points to important actions on the part of domestics to deªne their own
reform agenda. Despite the fact that they were vulnerable to patronizing
employers, the sexual advances of husbands, and unscrupulous employ-
ment and “training” agencies, domestic workers formed communities
(often aided by new urban transportation systems and the growth of
popular entertainments) and found ways to resist exploitation, either by
simply quitting or, on occasion, organizing and lobbying for state-based
protections. May argues that domestic workers sought, like workers in
other industries, to shape and control the conditions of their employ-
ment.
Although the focus of May’s book is New York, this study addresses
important questions in women’s and labor history, as well as issues in
public policy, social reform, and the nature of the American welfare
state. It suggests that the omission of domestic service from New Deal
reforms had as much to do with the attitudes of middle-class women as
with the racist politics of southern congressmen. Furthermore, May sug-
gests that labor reform itself was limited by the reluctance of middle-class
women (and men) to count domestic work as real labor.
Susan Levine
University of Illinois, Chicago
The Collapse of American Criminal Justice. By William J. Stuntz (Cam-
bridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2011) 413 pp. $35.00
Legal scholars of all stripes have already hailed this book, published
shortly after the author’s death in 2011. Like a bowler unleashing a
strike, Stuntz takes dead aim at the center of conventional wisdom and
proceeds to knock all its pins aside. He recounts the antebellum lynch-
ings of some 300 white people (95), the success story of Prohibition
(185–186), and the long-term negative effects of the Warren Court’s en-
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forcement of the Bill of Rights against the states (235–236). The prob-
lem that the work addresses is that “the criminal justice system is doing
none of its jobs well: producing justice, avoiding discrimination, pro-
tecting those who most need the law’s protection, keeping crime in
check while maintaining reasonable limits on criminal punishment” (2).
The author attributes this collapse to a series of developments in
law, demography, and political structure during the last sixty years. In
making his argument, he moves carefully through data collections, espe-
cially ones involving crime statistics and population trends abroad as well
as at home, that too rarely appear in works of legal history. He writes,
“Though most of this work is about the past and a few portions of it deal
with empirical data, I am neither a historian nor an empirical social sci-
entist as members of those guilds will quickly recognize” (9)—not be-
cause of any failure on his part to consult the relevant sources but be-
cause of what he does with his data. As a “historian,” he does not
hesitate to seek lessons from the past for the present and future, and as an
“empiricist,” he is willing “to draw unconªdent conclusions based on
incomplete evidence” rather than to narrow his temporal focus by mak-
ing only such claims as high-quality data can prove (10).
This decision to paint in broad strokes both gives the book its icon-
oclastic strength and leaves it vulnerable to criticisms that the particular
historical elements from which the argument is constructed are mislead-
ingly portrayed. Tersely stated, the argument centers on two problems
that the criminal justice system faced at the middle of the last century—
on the one hand, the problem of government abuse and discrimination
(disproportionately in the South) and, on the other hand, the increase in
crime. As prior history had shown, the appropriate responses would
have been to increase police presence on the streets and to use the court
system to enforce substantive limits on criminal law in order to reduce
the discretionary power of prosecutors. Those responses would have lo-
cated the key decisions regarding culpability in the jury—which, being
composed of local citizens subject to both the depredations of criminals
and the abuses of ofªcials, would have been the proper locus of power
(302–304).
But the opposite happened. The courts focused on procedural
rights, and legislators took advantage of this orientation to write more
and more capacious criminal statutes, with two negative results. First,
prosecutors’ legitimate exercise of discretion in bringing charges became
so broad that discrimination is almost impossible to prevent ex ante
(301). Second, because under such statutes almost every defendant is
guilty of something, criminal cases today consist of a preliminary attack
on procedural aspects of the prosecution’s case followed by a guilty plea
(229;139, 302) rather than a jury trial. Meanwhile, changes in budgetary
incentives have smoothed the way to increasing prison populations
rather than police forces (253–255).
The solution, as envisioned in this book, lies in returning to the
policy path that should have been taken six decades ago. It would in-
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volve a series of fundamental legislative and judicial reforms, the effect of
which would be to locate all decisions regarding criminal law at the level
of the constituencies affected—for instance, jury trials for alleged crimi-
nals rather than plea bargains—and to institute fair and effective policing
practices that would minimize excessive, knee-jerk incarceration (283).
“Could all these changes happen? Yes. Will they happen? Probably not”
(307). But all future debates about criminal-justice reform will be deeply
indebted to this book for its analysis of the situation.
Eric M. Freedman
Hofstra Law School
DDT and the American Century: Global Health, Environmental Politics, and
the Pesticide that Changed the World. By David Kinkela (Chapel Hill, Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 2011) 257 pp. $39.95
The chemical pesticide ddt is hardly new to environmental history.
Born of the mid-twentieth century and used as an insecticide to ªght
malaria and to protect agriculture, ddt became infamous as one of the
antagonists in Rachel Carson bestseller Silent Spring (New York, 1962),
considered by many historians as the seminal event in popularizing ecol-
ogy and launching the American environmental movement. Indeed,
scholars such as Russell and Dunlap have explored the rise of ddt and its
eventual fall, the chemical ªnally banned domestically in the United
States in the early 1970s.1 Like the work of these earlier scholars,
Kinkela’s new book recognizes that the story of ddt combines eco-
nomic, political, and social forces with science. Kinkela agrees that the
tale, though signiªcant historically, hardly lends itself to easy interpreta-
tion or conclusion. The value of his book—and its point of departure
from earlier works—is that it places ddt in a broader context, adding
more about ddt’s international impact. In short, Kinkela injects some
diplomatic history into the already complex story, noting ddt’s impor-
tance, both practically and symbolically, for America’s standing in the
world. Although Kinkela is by no means a revisionist downplaying ddt’s
negative ecological ramiªcations, his more global perspective implies to
a greater degree the positive impact of ddt, suggesting that properly
controlled—and with the lessons of the past ªrmly in mind—ddt will
have at least some value in the future. In fact, it has been re-introduced
in Africa to control malaria.
ddt, KInkela argues, was an important part of America’s Cold War
efforts to promote prosperity and freedom. With an unbridled faith in
technological innovation, America embraced the “Green Revolution”
(61), which promoted science as key to improving crop yields in the
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Third World and even eradicating malaria. This faith that through a pro-
cess of destruction and renewal, American science and technology
promised a more prosperous future came to symbolize the United States
and its role in the international postwar community. It deªned what au-
thor Henry Luce labeled the “American Century.” The emergence of
Carson and environmentalism, however, threw this dominant ethic into
doubt. Although Carson did not dismiss the use of chemical pesticides
per se, her criticism seemed to question American ideology and its
standing in the Cold War. Her arguments simpliªed, Carson became a
divisive ªgure as the momentum grew for the domestic ban. The eco-
logical reality now dawning, the American-promoted Green Revolu-
tion had failed, and the American Century had ended.
Kinkela is at his best noting the complexity behind this apparent
evolution. Readers, for example, will probably be surprised to ªnd that
America continued to sell ddt abroad even after the domestic ban, some
questioning whether regulations for environmental impact statements
applied internationally. That organizations both public and private re-
acted differently around the world is hardly surprising given the varying
conditions. With widespread ddt use, mosquitoes eventually developed
resistance and, in recent years, cases of malaria have rebounded, suggest-
ing limits to ddt’s value. In the end, Kinkela’s story is detailed and well
sourced while remaining a relatively accessible narrative. It is a welcome
addition to the literature not only for scholars across many disciplines
but also general readers.
J. Brooks Flippen
Southeastern Oklahoma State University
People of Faith: Slavery and African Catholics in Eighteenth-Century Rio de
Janeiro. By Mariza de Carvalho Soares (Durham, Duke University Press,
2011) 321pp. $23.95
In 1994, Soares was amazed to discover a reference to the “Statutes
of the Congregation of the Minas-Makii Blacks in Rio de Janeiro”
(1786). Written by a congregant from the enslaved and subsequently
freed Africans of the “Kingdom of Makii” (modern-day Benin), the
nearly seventy-page document situated the group in Rio de Janeiro.
Theretofore, slave populations in colonial Rio de Janeiro were believed
to have been almost exclusively of Bantu origin. Thus began the re-
search that culminated in this book.
The methodology is particularly interesting. Soares searched for
traces of the Mina-Makii in every possible type of documentation.
Within Africa, she investigated the slave trade on the Mina Coast and
looked in vain for evidence of slaves exported to Rio de Janeiro in the
seventeenth or eighteenth century. However, she managed to ªnd slave
baptism records for the Rio parish of the Se that listed slaves whose
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mothers’ port of departure from Africa was Mina. Marriage and burial
records and wills also yielded slaves and ex-slaves identiªed as Mina.
Soares also found documents indicating that by 1740, at least four estab-
lished lay Catholic brotherhoods existed among the Mina blacks in Rio.
She surmised that membership in a brotherhood was the principal route
to social prominence for African slaves or ex-slaves. Hence, brother-
hoods became the focus of her research.
A central concept in this work is provenience, which refers to places
or social groups from which African people were taken as slaves; “pro-
venience” is an attribute of identity. Soares investigated how the Mina
constructed their group experience in a state of captivity, using proveni-
ence as an anchor. The analysis also centers on social groups (brother-
hoods) that reºect the deliberate choice of Mina to be associated with
others of similar origin (thus differentiating her approach from that of
Rodriguez, Bastide, or Herskovits).1
In the second half of the book, Soares combines the search for Mina
with an urban history of Rio de Janeiro during the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. She pays particular attention to the numerous chapels
connected to small black brotherhoods in the urban periphery. Although
never more than 10 percent of the slave population in Rio, the Mina-
Makii had a strong presence. Church burial records surprisingly indicate
that about half of the Mina burials were women. Since about two-thirds
of imported slaves were male, women apparently had a special promi-
nence in the urban black churches. Wills from the Mina demonstrate
that many women were remarkably successful in accumulating property
and active in promoting the brotherhoods. Black lay brotherhoods in
Rio de Janeiro engaged in elaborate festivals, processions, and funerals;
the election of kings and queens; and the organization of royal courts.
This book about a minor group of slaves and ex-slaves provides consid-
erable insight into the social organization and customs of slaves in the
colonial city.
Elizabeth Kuznesof
University of Kansas
Diseased Relations: Epidemics, Public Health, and State-Building in Yucatán,
Mexico, 1847–1924. By Heather McCrea (Albuquerque, University of
New Mexico Press, 2011) 288 pp. $27.95
In this study of the history of public-health campaigns in Yucatan, Mex-
ico, McCrea provides the historical background for an understanding of
the limitations that physicians and health-department ofªcials faced
while confronting a series of “disease moments” in the nineteenth and
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twentieth centuries. The focus is on epidemics of smallpox, cholera, and
yellow fever from the 1840s to 1924, the year in which the socialist gov-
ernment of the state was overthrown and public-health policies con-
nected to political mobilization were abandoned.
McCrae positions her study within the historiography of Mexico
and of public health, comparing and contrasting Yucatan with other
well-studied places, such as Hamburg, New York City, and Mexico
City. She does not claim to be a historian of science, although she em-
phasizes that medical science was for a long time confused and contra-
dictory regarding the etiology of disease. The book therefore is not truly
interdisciplinary in nature but falls squarely within the regional Mexican
historiographical tradition.
The most important theme of the book is that public health was not
simply a matter of the government trying to save lives. In Mexico, as
elsewhere, modern medicine was seen by elites as a means of advancing
civilization and eliminating “barbarism”—in this case, a struggle to im-
pose Western culture on an indigenous people who had every reason to
distrust their traditional ruling class, even in matters of health. The elitist
public-health campaigns frequently sought to save the upper class ªrst by
concentrating resources on Mérida, the state capital. Medical efforts de-
clined with distance from the capital. Failures were often blamed not just
on political instability—especially on the effects of the civil war referred
to as the Caste War—but also on the ignorance and backwardness of the
Maya. McCrae demonstrates that the yellow-fever campaign succeeded
because it was implemented by a socialist government willing to mobi-
lize the masses and to collaborate with the Rockefeller Foundation.
Unfortunately, the ªrst half of the book is based on a weak docu-
mentary base since the archives apparently did not yield a great deal of
information about most of the nineteenth century. McCrea therefore
ªlls out the ªrst several chapters with extended summaries of the Caste
War, the Church–state conºict, the henequen boom, and public health
in Mexico as a whole. She was better able to study yellow fever, the last
disease addressed, because of the extensive archival holdings of both the
Rockefeller Foundation and the state government.
The book inadvertently demonstrates that vague statistics are not
useful. A table purporting to reveal the discrimination that certain areas
faced with respect to the distribution of smallpox vaccine is spurious be-
cause the data do not distinguish between cities and the political districts
containing those cities (27). An analogy would be the failure to specify
whether a certain set of statistics pertained to New York City or New
York State. McCrae also makes mistakes about Mexico that are ex-
tremely disconcerting: for example, that Coahuila is a state in central
Mexico and that Carmen (a town and capital of a political district in
Campeche) is in Quintana Roo (24, 78–79). In addition, she betrays a
lack of understanding of Hispanic culture by frequently using the mater-
nal rather than the paternal surname of historical personages and authors.
The accumulation of errors (such as accidently referring to Salvador
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Alvarado as Salvador Allende) undermines the overall value of the book
(242).
Robert W. Patch
University of California, Riverside
The Ailing City: Health, Tuberculosis, and Culture in Buenos Aires, 1870–
1950. By Diego Armus (Durham, Duke University Press, 2011) 432 pp.
$99.95 cloth $27.95 paper
Armus has written a fascinating story about the ways by which people
tried to deal with tuberculosis in Argentina from 1870 to 1950. He is ad-
amantly modest about what he covers in the book: “I seek to provide
. . . a record of the images, implications, and concrete experiences that
were the stuff of a subculture which . . . gave tuberculosis its meaning
and deªned its role. . . . [and became] a way of speaking not only about
biomedical issues but also about other matters.” Thus, he sees the book
as simply portraying how porteños experienced and thought about tuber-
culosis (tb), but it is much more. Well steeped in the international litera-
ture about the history of tb and aware that it rarely appears in cities and
countries beyond Europe and North America, he claims to make no di-
rect comparisons, but he can hardly avoid it. Similarly, he eschews many
theoretical interpretations, preferring the evidence to speak for itself,
but, again, he protests too much.
Armus skillfully reveals the complex social milieu of Buenos Aires at
a time when doctors reveled in notions of eugenics and contagion and
the hopes of cures, while everyday people struggled to deal with illness
informed by notions of race and gender, bewildered by the new world
of advertisements that promised cures. In the ªrst three chapters, he fo-
cuses on documents that explain how those who had the disease coped
with informal as well as institutional approaches to treatment at a time
when cures were uncertain, and no one understood how to prevent the
disease from infecting others. Armus refuses to interpret these docu-
ments himself, even though the selection of cases implicitly involves
value judgments on his part.
Chapter 4 deals with public policies and the quest of public-health
physicians to guarantee a healthy city in the midst of massive European
immigration and internal migration. Chapter 5 focuses on the prejudices
based on the fear of contagion and the eugenic desire to promote the
ideal family. Gendered differences in the experiences of patients, as well
as the effect of immigration and the desire to raise healthy children,
frame the next four chapters.
Whereas public-health physicians, eugenicists, and politicians
tended to blame both the poor and the tenement houses (conventillos) for
the increased incidence of tuberculosis, Armus shows that statistics prove
no such correlations. Indeed, tuberculosis was an indiscriminate attacker
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of urban inhabitants, and the tremendous growth of the urban popula-
tion and the general expansion of Buenos Aires contributed to its ability
to attack individuals. Furthermore, people tended to resist the kinds of
public-health campaigns designed to limit the spread of contagious dis-
eases, such as the prohibition of spitting in the subways and on the
streets, the formulation of strict guidelines to care for infants and young
children, and efforts to separate families from ill loved ones. These sto-
ries are poignant and resonate today regarding the efªcacy of behavior
modiªcation for contagious diseases.
This work is rich in personal anecdotes and depth of ªeld, showing
the resonance of disease in music, theater, poetry, and sports. Although
not a book for those unacquainted with the history of Buenos Aires, it is
most welcome for those interested in the social history of disease, and
specialists in the history of Argentina.
Donna J. Guy
Ohio State University
The Spirits and the Law: Vodou and Power in Haiti. By Kate Ramsey (Chi-
cago, University of Chicago Press, 2011) 425 pp. $45.00
Anthropological studies of Haitian popular religion are legion, but few
of them deal with its history other than to claim for it an important role
in the revolution of 1791 to 1804, which ended slavery and made Haiti
the Americas’ second independent state. This impressive book provides
an ethnologically informed history of Vodou with a particular focus on
the politics of law. In four chapters of increasing length, Ramsey deals
with the colonial and revolutionary periods, the nineteenth century, the
U.S. occupation from 1915 to 1934, and the debates of the following
decade surrounding an emergent cultural nationalism. Ramsey’s central
problem is to explain why the state only intermittently enforced the laws
that criminalized popular ritual practices from colonial times until the
1987 constitution. The plasticity of the term vaudoux and the vague
wording of the laws, which failed to distinguish sorcery from familial
and communal religious practice, provide much of the answer. The like-
lihood that state agents at the local level participated in such practices
was another factor, as was the incorporation of elements of Catholicism
into Vodou.
The ªrst, briefest chapter is a solid and judicious overview of
magico-religious practices during the period of slavery. Relying on
printed, mainly secondary, sources, Ramsey surveys the development of
legal prohibitions and the controversy regarding Vodou and the Haitian
Revolution. The focus is political rather than cultural. In the post-
independence period, the state continued to fear the subversive potential
of popular religion and perhaps the detrimental inºuence of its celebra-
tions on agricultural productivity, but new motives also inºected its
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criminalization. Although denigration of popular culture underpinned
the new elite’s claim to power and its exploitation of the masses, the sen-
sitivity of this elite to foreign opinion reinforced the state’s desire to
condemn “barbarous” practices that increasingly shaped Haiti’s interna-
tional image. Ramsey stresses that such restrictions often had broad pop-
ular support when they targeted sorcery or, as in the notorious Bizoton
case of 1864, reputed anthropophagy. Yet most of the major campaigns
against popular religion were spearheaded by foreigners—the French-
dominated Catholic Church or the American occupying forces.
The two twentieth-century chapters, which draw on various ar-
chives and Ramsey’s oral interviews, are the most deeply researched and
original. Ramsey highlights the American miltary’s discursive use of
“voodooism” in justifying at different levels its actions in Haiti and in
depicting the varied ways in which Haitians responded. The book cli-
maxes with the development of the black-nationalist indigenist move-
ment of the 1920s and 1930s and the state’s diverse reaction to it, which
included more precisely worded legal prohibitions, the last of the drum-
burning anti-superstition campaigns, and ofªcial efforts to package pop-
ular religion as folklore. These years also saw an upsurge in U.S. anthro-
pological interest in Haiti, as well as the appearance of the “zombi ºick.”
An epilogue brieºy extends the narrative into the era of the Duvalier
governments.
This richly detailed and sophisticated study, supported by 150 pages
of notes, extends the work of Hurbon and makes an original argument
about the interaction of law, culture, and development.1
David Geggus
University of Florida
Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400–1948. By Paul S. Landau
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 300 pp. $90.00
The marked interdisciplinary ºavor of this innovative and important
book makes it particularly appropriate for engagement by readers of this
journal. Landau’s research design focuses on intensive scrutiny of the or-
igins of southern African languages and political alliances, using mission
records, early travelers’ accounts, and correspondence, as well as oral tra-
ditions and interviews and archeological evidence. He deploys research
techniques from history, historical linguistics, and religious and mission
studies. By centering on the southern highveld (South Africa, Lesotho,
and Botswana) and the Moroka clan in particular, Landau is able to use
his Setswana language skills to draw wide comparative lessons. European
missionaries from the early nineteenth century onward encountered
people who had joined together politically despite their differing ances-
try. Analysis of names strongly suggests “tribal” words were, in fact, situ-
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ational indicators of political afªliation, intimating even wider patterns
of amalgamation.
In six concise yet amply sourced chapters, Landau traces the “birth
of the political” from 1400 through the onset of apartheid. He begins
with “eyewitness engagements” seen through political discourses of the
1800s before visiting earlier centuries to trace the “history before tribes”
via the evidence of alliances and ªnally undertaking an analysis of
the role of translation. Three chapters then follow the Morokas and oth-
ers from independent reign to colonial subjection and thence to the
twentieth-century formation of “tribes.”
Landau’s ºair for intellectual and religious history and historical lin-
guistics has long been apparent, but this book is far more ambitious in its
interdisciplinary and longue durée scope. Previous attempts at unraveling
the complex meaning of precolonial terminology of identity have often
been at the expense of simplicity.1 This book, however, makes clear
how Bantu language speakers indicated such identity. Drawing on prior
research by Vansina, Ranger, and others, Landau re-asserts African
agency by highlighting the resilience of their political cultures and their
adeptness at incorporating diverse peoples.2
The effect of Landau’s approach is persuasive, and his conclusions
are startling. Africans across the sub-continent already had amalgamated
before arrival of missionaries. “Tribes” did not exist in the precolonial
era; missionaries invented them. Politics made ethnicity, not vice versa
(41). Africans were tribalized, not de-tribalized, in missions as they faced
loss of power, land, and livelihood, weakening an earlier matrix of
hybridity that was more integrating of outsiders. Landau also questions
the obligatory attribution of religiosity to past polities by archeologists,
historians, and anthropologists. He stresses shared inºuences across large
spaces and prioritizes partnerships over centrifugal forces. His rethinking
of ritual vis-à-vis rational behavior is refreshing, opening new pathways
for the exploration of African secularism, or at least the relationship be-
tween secularity and ritual.
Landau’s conclusion that “hybridity lay at the core” of African
“subcontinental political traditions” and his emphasis on the resilience
of alliances that re-appeared in different forms raise interesting ques-
tions (xi). What were the attitudes and other forms of political, intellec-
tual, and social consciousness and organizational structure in precol-
onial times and what respective weight should we place on continuity or
change? Less satisfying in Landau’s broad treatment of territory and time
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is the relatively scant attention paid to disjuncture. For twentieth-
century politics, Landau focuses on the Samuelites (supporters of de-
posed chief Samuel Moroka), with some attention to other inºuential
political movements. But closer consideration of the intersection of poli-
tics with religion would have been instructive. Moreover, the tight re-
gional focus begs the question of what was happening elsewhere. The
argument that the old traditions of alliance never died is convincing, but
there were new external and internal forces at play.
Nonetheless, this book is a breakthrough in African historiography
with wide comparative value; its re-conceptualizing of changing organi-
zations, discourses, and likely intellectual histories will force scholars to
rethink great swathes of history. Landau shows that the critical analysis
and imaginative use of historical sources, together with a close attention
to language, can resolve seemingly intractable historical problems.
Peter Limb
Michigan State University
Ataturk: An Intellectual Biography. By M. Sukru Hanioglu (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 2011) 273 pp. $27.95
Mustafa Kemal, later M. Kemal Ataturk, became a surprisingly consum-
mate nation-builder as he rescued the remnants of the Ottoman Empire
in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace from destruction and dismemberment.
His efforts enabled the resurrection of the Turkish state and the restora-
tion of Turkish society after the losses and disgrace of the Balkan Wars
and World War I. Many authors have explored Turkey’s rise from the
ashes of empire; this book by Hanioglu is among the very best examina-
tions of Ataturk and the Turkish founding period in English.
Other scholars have looked at Ataturk’s psychodynamics or at the
details of his accomplishments. Many of them have indulged in hagiog-
raphy. Among the numerous virtues of Hanioglu’s clear-eyed dissection
of the Ataturkian legend is its refusal to regard Mustafa Kemal as wholly
exceptional. Although Hanioglu wisely appreciates everything that
Ataturk did to set Turkey on its modern course, he is less overwhelmed
than earlier writers by the sheer glamour and domineering qualities of
the man, the leader, and the lawgiver. Hanioglu understands better than
most of his scholarly predecessors the deep Ottoman and European ori-
gins of many of Ataturk’s revolutionary ideas and ideals. He sets the
making of Ataturk ªrmly in the Balkan ferment of Salonica, where
Ataturk lived and was schooled, and in Macedonian cities like Montasir
(modern Bitola), where he was a military cadet. Ataturk was not alone
among young Turks and young ofªcers in wanting to be Western. But
he was rare in biding his time, soldiering on the periphery of empire,
and avoiding the German involvement that ensnared so many of the
ofªcial Young Turk movement before and during World War I.
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The Gallipoli campaign in 1915 was Ataturk’s unexpected triumph.
As Hanioglu reports, the young Col. Kemal was distinctive in being able
to convert his defense of the Dardenelles, and his protection of the
motherland against superior Entente forces, into a catapault to national
notice and prominence. Later Kemal was successful on the eastern and
Mesopotamian fronts, skillfully seizing control of the embryonic Turkish
national movement in Anatolia after the Armistice of Mudros in 1918.
Hanioglu shows how Ataturk maneuvered himself and others to achieve
dominance and ªnally realized that he could in fact become the legiti-
mate “savior” of the Turkish people. “The key to Ataturk’s success,” re-
ports Hanioglu, was not the “originality of his ideas but . . . the singular-
ity of the opportunity he seized” (228).
This is hardly an interdisciplinary study. Nor does it break new
methodological ground. But it is more than a narrative. Hanioglu
weaves the intellectual strands of Ataturk and Turkish nationalism into a
convincing fabric that is less biography than explanation. Hanioglu
rightly emphasizes Ataturk’s “scientism” and his determination to force
the triumph of reason over religion. Ataturk was a civilizer and a social
engineer who believed that Ottomans and Turks had long been held
back by Islam—an Arab faith and “a vehicle for Arab domination”
(132)—by clerics, by the caliphate, by Eastern rather than Western head-
gear and garments, by a serious lack of education, and by a religiously in-
spired narrowness. Ataturk was among the twentieth century’s most dra-
matic modernizers and micromanagers. Hanioglu suggests that Ataturk
reformed Turkish society but, paradoxically, that his reforms did little
for the masses; Ataturk’s reforms, Hanioglu says, hardly penetrated be-
low the level of the elite (222).
Previous biographies may have showed us how Kemal became
Ataturk, but Hanioglu tells us much more about the forces that shaped
him and his powerful ideas. Yet, there is little in this book, or in others,
about how Ataturk exercised mastery over his compatriots. A full study
of Ataturk’s leadership abilities and quality would be welcome.
—R. I. R.
Conceiving Citizens: Women and the Politics of Motherhood in Iran. By
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011)
317 pp. $99.00 cloth $29.95 paper
One of the toughest nuts to crack for students of women and gender
in the Middle East is whether or not to describe a modern policy or
movement as “feminist.” Could a state effort at improving women’s lit-
eracy be inspired by genuine feminist commitment to sexual equality?
Sure. Could it also be a half-measure, cynically designed to co-opt an
equal-rights feminist agenda? Of course. In short, a conªdent assessment
of continuity and change in cultural attitudes toward gender has been
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elusive—especially in the case of modern Iranian society. In 1995,
Parvin Paidar asserted that there was no essential difference between the
misogyny of leftists, nationalists, and Islamists. How can a society com-
mit to both the forced unveiling of women (from 1936 to 1941) and
forced veiling of women (since 1979) under the general rubric of
women’s progress?
Kashani-Sabet brings three important contributions to the problem.
First, her analysis is carefully rooted in a superb review and synthesis of
scholarly literature through 2010. Second, she incorporates two impor-
tant cultural primary sources. Her analysis of late nineteenth-century
treatises on public health illustrates how their concerns helped to set the
framework for discussions of “the woman question”in the twentieth-
century popular press and in policy circles. Her skillful selection of im-
ages from the press fully displays the cultural divide between Pahlavi Iran
and Islamic Republican Iran, as well as the key continuities in their
maternalist discourse. Indeed, Kashani-Sabet’s transposition of “matern-
alism” from the Western to the Iranian context is her third contribution,
providing explanatory coherence to the good, the bad, and the ugly as-
pects of Iran’s experience of feminism.
Maternalists, in Kashani-Sabet’s analysis, “did not at all wish to es-
tablish gender equality or to combat patriarchy. . . . [Maternalist] priori-
ties for Iranian policy makers mattered because they advanced the state’s
political ideology (5).” Framing the analysis this way occasionally causes
Kashani-Sabet to elide the mix of feminist and maternalist ideas that a
society or individual may have at any given historical moment. This
drawback is apparent in her discussion of women’s suffrage from the
1940s to the 1960s. But the sources themselves do not disclose the full
extent of an individual’s commitment to maternalism or feminism,
partly because maternalism does not exist as a formal ideology separate
from other intellectual and political commitments. One context that
shows the viability of Kashani-Sabet’s thesis about Iranian maternalism,
however, is the constitution of the Islamic Republic—notably, Articles
20 and 21.1 Though it is not the focus of her study, Kashani-Sabet’s anal-
ysis of Iranian maternalism reveals these articles less as shallow window
dressing than as an Islamist expression of maternalism.
The Islamist strand of maternalism that now forms part of the legiti-
macy of today’s Islamic Republic was not in evidence before 1940. It has
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rights, both the material and intellectual; (2) protect mothers, particularly during pregnancy
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without support; and (5) award the guardianship of children to worthy mothers in order to
protect the interests of the children in the absence of a legal guardian.
stretched over time to allow for some important women’s rights (partic-
ularly, suffrage) without ever approaching a feminism of equal rights.
Yet, as the epilogue of the book notes, the One Million Signatures
Campaign of 2006 and the Green Movement of 2009 show that an Ira-
nian Islamist equal-rights feminism has, in fact, emerged in opposition to
a maternalist Islamic Republic. Thus, with this more complete picture,
Kashani-Sabet’s book is able to recount the historical changes in cultural
attitudes about gender in modern Iran more deªnitively.
Camron Michael Amin
University of Michigan, Dearborn
Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine. By Laura Robson (Aus-
tin, University of Texas Press, 2011) 239 pp. $55.00
As Islamist politics continues to assume greater prominence throughout
the Middle East, the sectarian diversity of the area’s Arab peoples is fre-
quently overlooked. The work under review constitutes an important
intervention in a modest but growing literature that seeks to document
the modern experience of Arab Christians, and, broadly, how both the
Ottoman Empire and Western colonial powers inºuenced the develop-
ment of sectarian identities in the Middle East during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.
Robson’s focus is the Palestine Mandate, namely, the British colo-
nial authority that governed Palestine during the interwar period and
was ostensibly intended to facilitate the rise of democratic self-govern-
ment in the area. In fact, as Robson seeks to demonstrate, the Mandate
authorities consciously fostered sectarian institutions within Palestine
that would undermine efforts to develop an Arab Palestinian polity. By
preventing solidarities that might extend across sectarian lines, the Brit-
ish made themselves, to their thinking, indispensable mediators of en-
demic conºict among Muslims, Christians, and Jews.
What makes this work so valuable is the skill with which Robson
demonstrates that the sectarian spirit of the governing institutions devel-
oped by the British was, in fact, a departure from past practice in the
area. Similar to recent Indian historiography with reference to British
rule in the subcontinent, Robson establishes that British “respect” for
sectarian divisions was not so much a “concession to native sensibilities”
as an “invented tradition” that was deployed in an effort to divide and
rule. Hence, British support for such institutions as the Supreme Muslim
Council and such positions as the Grand Mufti of Palestine tended not
so much to preserve a purported “delicate sectarian balance” as to create
and exacerbate sectarian tensions.
However, as Robson importantly illustrates, sectarianism was not
simply a colonial imposition on Palestine. Rather, Palestinian Christians
reckoned with the state-supported Supreme Muslim Council by devel-
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oping distinctly Christian movements that had no precedent in the area.
Indeed, the book chronicles the rise and struggles of the Arab Orthodox
movement, which sought to wrest control of the Greek Orthodox patri-
archate from Greek nationals and deliver it into Arab hands, as well as
Christian efforts to secure greater representation on municipal councils.
Both English- and Arabic-language sources contribute to the devel-
opment of a nuanced portrait of the rise of sectarian politics under the
Palestine Mandate. As one would expect, the papers of the Mandate au-
thorities play a vital role in constructing this portrait, but Robson ex-
tends her purview well beyond the British National Archives to include
such newspapers as Filastin and Al-Karmil, as well as the writings of such
Palestinian Christians as Khalil al-Sakakini and ‘Izzat Tannus.
Robson’s approach to sources, though meticulous, is excessively
cautious: Her announced concern is as much with cultural as it is with
political developments, but the text is overwhelmingly concerned with
detailed political narrative. What might Robson have made of her
sources had she adopted an anthropological sensibility in examining
them and extended her focus beyond the machinations of the Arab
Christian elite? Yet, of greater concern is the puzzling absence among
her references of two pivotal dissertations, intimately linked to her
topic—Campos’ “A ‘Shared Homeland’ and Its Boundaries” and Rob-
erts’ “Rethinking the Status Quo.”1
Paul Sedra
Simon Fraser University
Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global Economic Divergence,
1600–1850. By Prasannan Parthasarathi (New York, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2011) 365 pp. $90.00 cloth $29.99 paper
For many years, one of the biggest questions mulled over by economic
historians has been why Europe rather than Asia ªrst came to dominate
the global economy. The bulk of the ruminations on this issue have fo-
cused on the superiority of early modern European, and especially Brit-
ish, institutions, whether they be legal arrangements that protected indi-
vidual property rights, a more enlightened and rationalistic belief system
that emerged from the Protestant Reformation, a marriage and kinship
structure that delayed fertility, or some other structural arrangements
that, theoretically, furthered economic development in the West but
had no equivalent in other societies around the globe.
During the past decade or so, the “California school” of East Asian
historians, particularly Pomeranz, has changed the terms of the debate.
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Rejecting the notion of a stagnant, traditionalist Asia, they have pointed
out the vibrancy of the pre–nineteenth-century Chinese economy and
the relatively similar levels of consumption between its most developed
regions and their counterparts in Western Europe. The “great diver-
gence,”as Pomeranz has termed it, occurred later, during industrializa-
tion. It is best studied by looking not only at what blocked Asia from
following in Europe’s footsteps but also at why Europe deviated from
successful methods of production pioneered in Asia.1 Parthasarathi’s in-
telligent new book continues in the same vein but focuses primarily on
the divergence between Britain and India from the 1600s, when India
enjoyed considerable prosperity, to the early nineteenth century, when
the subcontinent’s economy failed to grow.
Parthasarathi argues that, as happened in China, the silver that en-
tered India as payment for its manufactures, principally cotton textiles,
placed it in an enviable position throughout most of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Indian property rights, the caste system, and birth-
rates have been erroneously cast as major barriers to economic growth
during this period. Rather than obsessing about the cultural differences
between India and Europe, Parthasarathi directs attention to the eco-
nomic problems in Britain—namely, competition from Indian cottons
and deforestation—that led ultimately to the adoption of new processes.
Britain’s ªrst response to the threat that calico posed to its light-weight
woolens was to ban it for domestic consumption, hardly a forward-
thinking or proto-Smithean reaction. Only much later in the century
did mechanical innovation in spinning result in the production of a rival
cotton cloth. Parthasarathi notes that textile manufacturers in the Otto-
man Empire also faced the problem of Indian calicos ºooding their mar-
kets, but its government did not act against the commodity’s invasion as
Britain’s and France’s did. The substitution of coal for wood also
beneªted from government intervention, eventually playing a role in in-
dustrial development that few foresaw initially. Because India had no en-
ergy crisis and was in the cat’s seat so far as textile sales were concerned,
it had no incentives to follow the path of the British. The change in In-
dia’s circumstances came after 1780 when the East India Company and
then the imperial authorities began to tighten their grip on the Indian
economy, and the British cotton mills began taking market share from
their weaving establishments.
Using the research of other economists and historians as well as his
own, Parthasarathi contends that Indian technology did not stand still
during the early modern period; nor did Indians ignore scientiªc infor-
mation from Europe. Indian princes sponsored research and established
libraries at their courts, and artisans adopted new industries, including
the building of ships for the East India Company. British imperial policy,
348 | C A RO L E S H A M M A S
1 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern
World Economy (Princeton, 2000).
however, worked against these efforts. In his last chapter, Parthasarathi
documents this thwarting of Indian manufacturing.
This book contributes signiªcantly to the project of de-
traditionalizing the Asian economy of the early modern period by dem-
onstrating the strength of Indian manufacturing in the global economy
and the inadequacies of theories about institutional barriers to develop-
ment. It also raises questions about the direct role of the government and
military in the so-called European miracle of economic growth. The
point at which Parathasarathi’s argument seems most vulnerable is in its
failure to confront how Western European dominance in oceanic trade,
and consequently its ability to set many of the terms of that trade, repre-
sented a problem for Asian economic development, regardless of how
superior its manufactures might have been. Parathasarathi offers frag-
mentary evidence on the proportion of the population engaged in non-
agricultural activities and on the rise of a shipbuilding industry (70), but
India appears not to have possessed a maritime sector at all comparable to
that of early modern Western Europe.
Carole Shammas
University of Southern California
Empire’s Garden: Assam and the Making of India. By Jayeeta Sharma (Dur-
ham, Duke University Press, 2011), 324 pp. $94.95 cloth $24.95 paper
In this path-breaking study, Sharma traces the transformation of Assam
during the colonial era from “jungle” to “garden,” and from a remote
backwater to a lively participant in a modern India. Since Assam is al-
most never included in the larger histories of India, this careful and
thoughtful study is especially welcome. Sharma imaginatively integrates
the growth of the plantation economy with the growth of a distinctive
modern culture. Indeed, she argues, Assam’s distinctive identity cannot
be separated from the tea industry; the colonial economy effectively dic-
tated the path of cultural development in the province.
The ªrst three chapters, collectively entitled “Making a Garden,”
provide the reader with a succinct and compelling account of the rise of
tea in Assam from the 1850s, and why it took the shape that it did, on
British-owned plantations staffed with Bengali clerks and migrant labor-
ers recruited as “coolies” from distant Central India. Local Assamese
elites, initially educated in Calcutta, though reluctant to submit to the
regimen of the plantation, nevertheless applauded the industry as “the
model for Assam’s progress” (48).
At the heart of Sharma’s account is the struggle of the province’s
newly educated class to exclude immigrant “coolies” and local hill peo-
ple alike from an emergent Assamese identity, as well as to shake off the
dominance of Bengalis who saw the Assamese as uncultivated rustics.
This concerted effort incorporated late Victorian racial theory to argue
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that high-caste Assamese were, in fact, ancient Aryan settlers, and, as
such, heirs to the larger Hindu culture of northern India. The indige-
nous hill peoples by contrast were racially “Mongoloid” (198). To bul-
wark their claims, these elites insisted that because the Asomiya language
had emerged directly from Sanskrit, it was not a local dialect of Bengali.
As a result, as Sharma points out, much of Assamese cultural activity was
directed toward the revitalization of Asomiya as a literary language, with
the aim of securing a “higher status” for the language and its speakers
(173).
Despite the distinctive path to modernity produced by Assam’s iso-
lation, and the overwhelming presence of the tea industry, much of the
story that Sharma recounts is a familiar one. As in other regions, includ-
ing Bengal itself, Christian missionaries played a critical role in sparking
the creation of an educated elite. When educated converts were not
forthcoming, they shifted their activities to the tribal people of the re-
mote hill areas, where sizable Christian communities exist to the present.
Subsequently, a “new Assamese public” gradually took shape; its publi-
cists “wrote and imagined into existence a new Assam.” As elsewhere,
their instruments were the “voluntary associations, clubs, public meet-
ings, petitions and pamphlets” of the modern print culture (147–148).
Over time, into the twentieth century, previously marginalized lower
castes and tribal communities began to secure education and set out to
contest the predominance of the high castes and their “Hindu narrative
of racial preeminence and superior entitlement” (207).
The end result was an Assam of “contesting publics,” as Sharma en-
titles her ªnal chapter, riven, even in the postcolonial era, by enduring
tensions. Empire’s Garden provides a rich set of reºections on regions, re-
gionalism, and the growth of nationalism in the modern world.
Thomas R. Metcalf
University of California, Berkeley
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